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Introduction
On January 26, 2016, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) released a
watershed decision in a complaint spearheaded by the First Nations Child and Family Caring
Society of Canada, its Executive Director, Dr. Cindy Blackstock, and the Assembly of First
Nations (the “Caring Society” decision).1

The complaint alleged that Canada, through its

Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (“INAC” or the “Department”), discriminates
against First Nations children and families in the provision of child welfare services on reserve.
In its decision, the Tribunal found that INAC’s design, management and control of child welfare
services on reserve, along with its funding formulas, cause a number of harms to First Nations
children and families that amount to discrimination, most notably among these is the systemic
underfunding of such services. Canada has decided not to appeal the decision.2

The decision is the first in Canada to begin to examine the problems and harms existing within
the current system of program delivery in First Nations communities. These problems and harms
are not unique to the delivery of child welfare on reserve, but extend to all core services
including health, social welfare, assisted living, daycare, education, housing and infrastructure,
policing and emergency services. In First Nations communities, all of these services, although
delivered by First Nations themselves, are governed by a complex web of federal funding
directives, policies and funding agreements, wherein the primary program delivery standard is
‘comparability’ with the provinces/territories services. The current system of program delivery
on reserve has been variously described as “program devolution”, “self-management”, and “selfadministration”.3 In the Caring Society decision itself, the Tribunal referred to this system as the
“programming/funding approach.”4 Unless referring to a specific feature of this system, I will

1

First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 (“Caring Society”).
2
CBC News, “Federal government won’t appeal ruling that found it discriminated against children on reserves,”
February 22, 2016.
3
Rae, J., “Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone of Quagmire for First Nations?” (2009) 7 (2) Indigenous
LJ 1 at 6-17; see also Cornell S., Curtis, C., and Jorgensen, M., “The Concept of Governance and its Implications for
First Nations” in Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2004-02, at 8-10.
4
Caring Society, supra note 1, para. 83.
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generally refer to all of it herein as the ‘current system for program delivery’ on reserve, or
“CSPD” for short.

Over the years, the Auditor General of Canada has raised numerous concerns with CSPD. In
2011, the Auditor General went so far was to say that it “severely limit[s] the delivery of public
services to First Nations communities and hinder[s] improvements in living conditions on
reserves.”5 The CSPD, which has been in place for decades despite several calls for reform by
the Auditor General and others, is so convoluted that it is almost impenetrable. But the Caring
Society decision has shed light on some of it ugly features and, most importantly, arms First
Nations with the necessary tools to finally dismantle this entirely unacceptable system.

In this paper, my aim is to do a few things. First, I will detail how CSPD has come to be, how it
operates and how it has persisted over numerous decades despite several calls to implement selfgovernment in its stead. Next, I endeavor to shed a light on all of its ugly features by setting
forth an inventory all of the problems and the harms it causes First Nations people. Systemic
underfunding is but one among many of the serious harms caused by CSPD. Finally, I discuss
how the Caring Society decision has discredited significant parts of CSPD and how the decision
can be used to unravel the rest. I will argue that the decision points us to the one true alternative
to this unacceptable system—First Nations self-government—which is long overdue.
Part 1 – The history and longevity of CSPD
1. The genesis of the ‘comparability’ standard

The first two centuries of relations between Indigenous peoples and Europeans in what is now
known as Canada has been described as the era of “Nation-to-Nations relations”, characterized
by friendship, trade partnership, inter-dependence and mutual respect. This era saw several
Peace and Friendship Treaties signed between British and several First Nations, as well as the
Royal Proclamation of 1763, wherein the British Crown referred to “the several Nations or
Tribes of Indians with who We are connected” and imposed the requirement of obtaining the
2011 Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 4, “Programs for First
Nations on Reserves” (“2011 Auditor General Report”), at 5.
5
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consent of these Nations in any transaction dealing with their lands, which in turn could only be
legally conducted with representatives of the Crown.6
This relationship changed dramatically, however, when Europeans’ objectives towards this land
went from seeking goods for trade to settlement and nation-building in the mid-1800s. Once the
objective became settlement, Indigenous people were no longer regarded as allies or trading
partners, but instead seen as impediments to expansion and primitive “savages”.7 Colonial
governments sought to segregate First Nations on small and less-than-desirable parcels of land,
hoping they would eventually become extinct from disease and starvation.8

Following

Confederation in 1867, and having jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians”
under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 9 the federal government pursued an active policy
of assimilation through the Indian Act, enacted in 1876,10 as well as through policy.11

In the late 1800s and up until the end of the First World War, despite First Nations being
destitute, displaced and ravaged by disease, Canada’s policy for providing relief assistance to
Indians was ad hoc. It was provided only periodically and reactively, on an ex post facto basis
each time need was established.12 Between the wars, relief was even further tightened and
generally only available to the elderly, ill and the infirm.13 At this time, Canadian policy deemed
it dangerous to accord welfare relief to Indians. According to Hugh Shewell:
Indian relief and education policies were concerned with turning Indians into moral,
thrifty workers. Indians were perceived as lazy, idle, and intemperate, and this
perception served to explain their dependence on the state and to justify the government’s
obsessive fear of that dependence.14

See Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP Report”), Volume 1, “Looking Forward,
Looking Back”, Chap. 5, “Stage Two: Contact and Co-operation”.
7
See RCAP Report, ibid., Chap. 6, “Stage Three: Displacement and Assimilation”; see also Summary of the Final
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada – Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future,
Introduction, at 1-26 (“TRC Summary Report”).
8
See RCAP Report, supra note 6, Chap. 6, at 136.
9
The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24).
10
Indian Act, SC 1876, c 18.
11
TRC Summary Report, supra note 7.
12
Shewell, H., ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’– Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004) at 327.
13
Ibid. at 329.
14
Ibid. at 328.
6
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When it came to issues relating to child welfare, children in need of protection were apprehended
by the Indian agent and either placed with another family on the reserve or sent to residential
school.15

The Second World War had a tremendous impact on the social and economic policies of
countries throughout the World, including Canada. By the end of the war, Canada was a nation
concerned about equality and the rights of citizenship.16 As well, following the war came the
rise of the welfare state in Canada and, with this, a great expansion of laws dealing with essential
services enacted by both provincial governments and Canada.17 Furthermore, following the
Second World War, as noted by Shewell and Spagnut, Canadians became more aware of the
impoverishment of Indians and, with a certain collective shame, sought the amelioration of their
condition.18

On the recommendations of the 1944 Parliament Committee on Post-war

Reconstruction, Canada appointed a ‘Joint House of Commons and Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs’ whose mandate was to enquire into the policies of the Indian Affairs Branch of
Department of Mines and Resources as well as into the general conditions of Indians living on
reserves.19
The Committee’s reports and recommendations consistently focused on the need to advance
Indians to full citizenship and equality. As in earlier times, the necessity for Indians to be
assimilated was a given, but, as noted by Shewell and Spagnut, the tone of this assumption had
changed: “It was no longer a question of subjugating Indians and of degrading their cultures, but
of extending to them their rightful opportunities to be full and equal citizens of Canada.”20 The
ethos of this period could be characterized as embracing ‘formal equality’, which subscribes to
the notion that everyone should be treated identically.21 Pursuant to this ethos, Indians ought to

Harris-Short, S., Aboriginal Child Welfare, Self-Government and the Rights of Indigenous Children – Protection
the Vulnerable Under International Law (Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, England, 2012) at 44.
16
Shewell, H., and Spagnut, A., “The First Nations of Canada: social welfare and the quest for self-government” in
Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples, ed., Dixon, J., and Scheurell, R.P., London: Routledge, 1995, at 2
(“Shewell and Spagnut”).
17
See G.V. Harten, G. Heckman and D.J. Mullen, Administrative Law - Cases, Text, and Materials, 6th ed. (Edmond
Montgomery Publications: 2010), Chapter 1, at 3-4 and 8.
18
Shewell and Spagnut, supra note 16 at 3.
19
Ibid.at 3.
20
Ibid.
21
Hogg, P., Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed.) (loose-leaf), Chap. 55, at para. 55.6(e).
15
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be treated as like all other citizens and their legal status as “Indians” and different legal
entitlements arising therefrom (treaties, reserves, the Indian Act, etc.) were perceived as holding
First Nations back from becoming full citizens.

This ethos of formal equality is reflected in a number of actions undertaken by Canada pursuant
to the Joint Committee’s recommendations. For example, in 1949, to symbolize its commitment
to make Indians into ‘citizens’, Canada made INAC a branch of the Department of Citizenship
and Immigration.22 In 1950, the Joint Committee reported that First Nations on reserves were
excluded from many federal social programs and most provincial and territorial services that
were now provided to Canadian citizens.

In response, the Committee recommended that

provinces and territories be more involved in delivering and funding social services to First
Nations.23

In 1951, the Indian Act underwent significant amendments, with Parliament removing some of
the more overtly discriminatory provisions from the Act (such as the prohibition on seeking legal
representation, and compulsory enfranchisement).24 Heretofore, the Indian Act did not contain
any laws regarding welfare or other essential services,25 and Parliament did not seek to change
this with these amendments despite the provinces having passed several laws on essential
services by this time. Instead, among the more significant additions to the Indian Act, was the
inclusion of s 88 (then s 87) which provides that “all laws of general application from time to
time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province” except
to the extent such laws were inconsistent with the Indian Act or regulations or by-law thereunder
and subject to the terms of any treaty or other federal law. 26 On its face, s 88 appears to delegate

22

Shewell and Spagnut supra note 16 at. 3.
Canada, INAC, Income Assistance Program – National Manual, 2005, at 13.
24
See Indian Act, SC 1951, c 29.
25
It is a common misconception that the Indian Act is a comprehensive statute covering all manner of subjects
having to do with First Nations people. The scope of the Indian Act is actually quite narrow covering only about
seven discrete areas: (1) Indian registration and Band membership rules (ss 5-14); (2) Indians’ collective interests in
reserve lands (how they can be surrendered, transferred, leased, expropriated, etc.) and a quasi-private property
regime for Band members (ss 18-41, and 53-60); (3) Indian wills and estates (ss 42-52); (4) taxation of Indians and
exemption from seizure of property on reserve (ss 87 and 89-90); (5) election of Band Councils (ss 74-80); (6) the
by-laws powers (ss 81-86); and (7) schools on reserve (ss 114-122).
26
Indian Act, 1951, supra note 24 at s 87 (now Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5, s 88).
23
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any matters not covered by the Indian Act or its regulations to provincial jurisdiction, including
legislation over essential services on reserve.27

It appears there was little discussion and debate about the meaning of the s 88 at the time it was
passed, and there is little on the public record providing a clear explanation of the government’s
rationale for it.28 Kerry Wilkins suggests that, at minimum, it was intended to clarify that
Indians had the right to sue in tort, contract and for debts that came due, as well as to address and
acknowledge the widespread sense that provincial law should not constrict treaty rights.29
Wilkins also suggests that a driving factor behind the provision was the Joint Committee’s strong
emphasis that the “provinces had a role to play in achieving the recognized long-term goal of
assimilation – or in later idiom, “integration” – of the Indian peoples into mainstream society.”30
Wilkins observes, however, that s 88 would have been beyond anything the Joint Committee had
contemplated:
Even here, though, Parliament in enacting s. 88, went well beyond the special joint
committee’s recommendations. The approach recommended by the committee, and later
endorsed explicitly by the federal minister, clearly emphasized cooperation, consultation,
and coordination between the two orders of government in pursuit of the long-term
objective [of assimilation]. Nothing in these reports, and next to nothing in the public
consultation informing them, encouraged or supported unilateral federal imposition of
provincial legislative regimes on Indians.31
If s 88 was intended to be a delegation to the provinces in the area of social services over
Indians, it was ineffective because it was a done unilaterally, as pointed out by Wilkins.
Parliament could not force the provinces to extend services to Indians—and spend provincial
revenues on them—if the provinces were unwilling.

As matter of constitutional law the

proposition is suspect,32 and, more importantly, that is what actually happened. The provinces
and territories did not automatically assume legislative and fiscal jurisdiction over Indians with
27

Section 88 was initially regarded the basis for the application of provincial laws to Indians. However, the
Supreme Court of Canada clarified in Dick v. La Reine, [1985] 2 SCR 309 that provincial laws that do not touch on
the core of “Indianess” apply to Indians ex proprio vigore (of their own force). See also R. v. Morris, [2006] 2 SCR
915.
28
Wilkins, K., “Still Crazy After All These Years”: Section 88 of the Indian Act,” (2000) 38(2) Alta. L.R. 458 at
460.
29
Ibid. at 462.
30
Ibid. at 463.
31
Ibid. at 464 [emphasis in original].
32
Ibid. at 471.
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the passing of s 88; they continued to see Indians as a federal responsibility. The only exception
was in the case of the extension of provincial child welfare laws on reserve, notably, the child
apprehension provisions in cases of abuse or neglect and this was not something that occurred
overnight.33 Indeed it only started to occur once the federal government agreed to reimburse the
provinces for their costs in the mid-1960s.34 Further, most of the provinces only extended their
apprehension services in cases of abuse or neglect and did not offer or fund prevention and earlyintervention services.35

With s 88 being largely ineffective as a means of delegating responsibility over Indians to the
provinces and territories, the federal government then sought to negotiate with the provinces for
their assumption of jurisdiction over essential services to Indians.36 In this regard, Canada was
successful in persuading one province.

The 1965 Memorandum of Agreement Respecting

Welfare Programs for Indians between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Ontario instituted a costs sharing arrangement respecting the application of provincial welfare
laws to Indian reserves in the province.37 Following its success with Ontario, Canada sought to
formalize a legal process for entering such arrangements. In 1966, Canada enacted the Canada
Assistance Plan, legislation which permitted Canada and individual provinces to enter costsharing agreements over the delivery of provincial social programs on reserve.38 However, no
other province or territory would agree to sharing responsibility with Canada over the provisions
of services on reserve.

Meanwhile during the time Canada was attempting to get the provinces and territories to provide
social programs on reserve, First Nations on reserve subsisted without access to the types of
services provided in the provinces, many living in extreme poverty and prevented by law from
exercising their traditional activities of hunting, fishing and gathering that their ancestors’ relied
on to sustain themselves. Eventually, the circumstances of endemic poverty on reserves gave
Some provinces would become involved, but only in “life or death” or “only in the most extreme cases of
neglect.” See Johnson, P., Native Children and the Child Welfare System, (Canadian Council on Social
Development in association with James Lorimer & Company: Toronto, 1983) at 7-16.
34
See Harris-Short, supra note 15 at 44; see also Johnson ibid.
35
Johnson ibid.
36
See INAC, Income Assistance Program – National Manual, supra note 23 at 13.
37
See Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 16 at 16.
38
Canada Assistance Plan, 1966 SC c. 45 [repealed SC 1995, c 17, ss. 31-32] (“CAP”), Part II, "Indian Welfare".
33
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rise to a further Joint Parliamentary Committee review of Indian Affairs’ policies and progress
beginning in 1959.39 Before the Committee, Indian Affairs officials maintained that progress
was slow partly because of varying degrees of Indian readiness to enter ‘modern’ Canadian life
and partly because of the reluctance of the provinces to extend their service on reserve. 40 The
Committee recommended Canada stay the course and called for more federal-provincial
cooperation.41

Mounting pressure for Canada to take action to address Indian poverty led to an independent
study of Indian Affairs in 1963, A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada, known as the
Hawthorne Report.42 The report called for the integration of Indians into Canadian society
through full extension of social, political and civil rights, but at the same time protecting Indians’
historically special status. It recommended Indian Affairs should continue to advocate for Indian
interests and co-operate with them on future policy, and criticized the provinces for being
indifferent to the plight of First Nations.43 Despite this admonition, the provinces continued to
insist that Indians were the sole responsibility of the federal government.44 The Hawthorne
Report was never fully endorsed by the federal government.

Faced with unwillingness from most of the provinces, Canada finally responded to the Indian
poverty crisis in 1964. In June 1964, Indian Affairs sent a request to Treasury Board for
approval of a request by the Department to adopt (and therefore spend) the equivalent provincial
and local municipal welfare rates for Indians on reserve “as a means of rectifying the present
inadequacy of the Indian Affairs Branch scale of assistance” and specifying that this would entail
spending “not only be in respect to food but also for clothing, fuel, household equipment, public
utilities such as water and electricity, rent, etc. as may be applicable.” 45 In July 1964, the

39

Shewell and Spagnut, supra note 16 at 4.
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid. at 4-5.
44
Ibid.
45
Citizenship & Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Authority to Introduce Increased Rates of Assistance to
Indians - Details of Request to the Honourable The Treasury Board”, Ottawa, June 16, 1964.
40
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Treasury Board approved the Department’s proposal “to adopt provincial or local municipal
standards and procedures for the administration of relief assistance for Indians.”46

Within days of this, the Director of the Indian Affairs Branch sent a letter to the supervisor of
each regional office, advising of the approval. The import of the approval was described as
“mak[ing] available to Indians the full range of assistance at the same scales and under the same
eligibility conditions as other needy persons in the province in which they reside.” The letter
also provided instruction on how Indian Affairs would proceed in implementing the approval.
The directive noted that it was likely not possible “to adopt all aspects of provincial policy to
departmental administration” and that, instead, each region was being asked to develop their own
“draft regulations which you feel should be applied to the administration of relief assistance for
Indians of your region.” The letter went on to explain that the drafting of said regulations should
involve the “examination and adaptation of provincial regulations to our own particular
situation” and would also require consultation with provincial welfare authorities.47
Although referred to as “regulations” by the Director of the Indian Affairs Branch, what
subsequently unfolded was not the development of “regulations” in a legal sense, but the creation
of regional policy manuals for the provision of social assistance on reserve modelled upon
provincial welfare laws and policies. The practice has continued to the present day.48 Initially,
the services under these policies were provided directly by Indian Affairs personnel, but this
would change with Canada’s policy shift to program devolution, detailed below.
As well, over time Canada’s approach regarding welfare services on reserve—to provide a level
of service comparable to the provinces—was expanded (via treasury board approvals) to include
all other essential service areas. This includes child welfare, assisted living, education, policing,
emergency services, health, day care, housing and infrastructure. Although relevant treasury
board authorities have been updated periodically, comparability with provincial/territorial
46

Treasury Board Minute, T.B. 627879, dated July 23, 1964.
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, “Circular 107 – Application of Provincial General Welfare
Assistance Programs”, Ottawa, July 20, 1974.
48
See for example INAC, Atlantic Regional Office, 1967 Social Welfare Regulation; and INAC, 1991 New
Brunswick Social Assistance Manual—First Nations Social Development Manual. Within the last twenty years,
national program manuals were also created in order to provide guidance to the regions. See INAC, Income
Assistance Program – National Manual, 2005, supra note 23.
47
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standards has generally remained the governing standard for the provision of all essential
services on reserve.49

2. The genesis of program devolution
Canada’s emphasis on citizenship and formal equality for Indians during the post-Second World
War period came to head in June 1969, when the government, under the administration of Pierre
Elliott Trudeau, tabled its Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, known as
“the White Paper.” Pursuant to the ethos of ‘formal equality’, the White Paper recommended
fundamental changes to the status of Indian people in Canada, notably the end of the distinct
status for Indians, the dissolution of Indian Affairs, the repeal of the Indian Act and its
replacement with an Indian Lands Act, so that Indians could be quickly shepherded into
mainstream society with its attendant services and opportunities.50

Heralded by the government as a progressive move in tune with social reform and civil rights,
First Nations, on the other hand, condemned the proposal as the ultimate attempt at
assimilation.51 In fact, First Nation opposition was so intense that the federal government
withdrew the White Paper in 1971 and declared an end to its assimilation policy.52

An

unintended consequence of the White Paper was to fuel a national First Nations resistance
movement and the creation of regional and national advocacy bodies, including the National
Indian Brotherhood (which would eventual become the Assembly of First Nations). Following
this, First Nations began to assert Aboriginal title and Aboriginal and Treaty rights in the courts,
demanded seats at the negotiation table to settle outstanding claims, and called for selfgovernment.53

These events led to some changes within the federal government. Following the withdrawal of
the White Paper, INAC began to place more emphasis on community development and Indian
49

See Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Indian and Northern Development and the
Treasury Board, August 1990.
50
Shewell and Spagnut, supra note 16 at 5.
51
See Johnson supra note 33 at 6-7.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
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band management training.54 In 1976, a Cabinet committee on First Nations social policy
recognized, among other things, that Aboriginal efforts at self-definition, self-management, and
self-determination should be encouraged, and that Aboriginal concepts of community priorities
are valid and should be considered by government when planning projects and programs.55 Also,
in 1976, Canada published a Government / Indian Relationships paper which accepted the
special Indian identity in Canadian society.56
In 1978, the House of Commons, still under the Trudeau’s Liberal government, appointed a
special house committee to study Indian self-government, made up of sitting MPs and
representatives from First Nation organizations, who sat over three years, hearing from a wide
array of interested parties, including INAC staff as well as First Nations. The Committee’s
report (called the “Penner Report”, as it was chaired by Ontario MP Keith Penner) was groundbreaking in its approach.57 It repudiated Canada’s assimilation policy and called on the federal
government to entrench Indian self-government in the constitution.

58

In addition to that, the

Report proposed a number of legislative measures, to occur irrespective of constitutional
entrenchment, to immediately begin implementing self-government in a flexible manner and at a
pace suitable the needs and capacities of each First Nation.59 The Report suggested that the scope
of powers of First Nation be akin to the powers of provincial governments and urged for there to
be fiscal transfers similar to the inter-governmental transfers between federal government and the
provinces.60 Finally, the Report recommended the phasing out of INAC within five years, to be
replaced with a “Ministry of State for Indian First Nation Relations” to protect and advocate for
Indian rights and interests, as well as to manage and co-ordinate Canada’s fiscal relationship
with First Nations.61

54

Shewell and Spagnut, supra note 16 at 17.
INAC, Income Assistance Program – National Manual, 2005, supra note 23.
56
INAC, “Indian Band Government Legislation” (1982) (National Archives).
57
Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government in Canada, First
Session of the Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83 (“Penner Report”). Available online:
http://caid.ca/PennerRep1983.pdf.
58
Ibid. at 43-44.
59
Ibid. at 46-50.
60
Ibid. at 94-102.
61
Ibid. at 133-134.
55
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The Department’s primary response to the changing discourse on First Nations issues occasioned
by negative reaction to the White Paper, was to put greater emphasis on program devolution to
First Nations. Program devolution is the transfer of resources and responsibility for delivery of
programs from INAC to First Nations and their institutions. In other words, instead of INAC
staff delivering programs and services directly, First Nations receive funding from the federal
government and are then expected to hire their own staff to provide these programs and services
to community members. As will be detailed further below, in order to do this, INAC enters
funding arrangements with First Nations.

According to some accounts, some ad hoc program devolution had begun prior to the withdrawal
of the White Paper in the 1950s and 60s.62 In 1979, Treasury Board approved the first set of
“Terms and Conditions for Contributions to Indian Bands and Organizations” explicitly
authorizing funding arrangements with First Nations to be entered for the purpose of
devolution.63

Services such as social assistance, child care, education, and community

infrastructure were among the first to be transferred from INAC to First Nations.64

However, program devolution would become a clear policy objective in the 1980s and 90s,
especially after the release of the Penner Report. Ironically, the Penner Report (for many of the
same reasons discussed in Part 2) was highly critical of the practice of program devolution and
called for its discontinuance in favour of immediate implementation of First Nation selfgovernment.65

Why Canada would then enthusiastically embrace devolution after the Penner

Report thoroughly impugned the practice, can be explained by a change in government.
Although Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government reacted favourably to the policy direction
recommended by the Penner Report and even introduced Bill C-52, entitled “An Act relating to
Self-Government for Indian Nations,” which incorporated many of the recommendations from
the Penner Report; the Liberals were defeated by the Progressive Conservative government of

INAC, “Communications Strategy – Task Force on Devolution”, March 16, 1992 (National Archives); and
Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 16 at 38.
63
Penner Report, supra note 57 at 20.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid. at 20-35 and 84-94.
62
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Brian Mulroney, who came to power in September 1984.66 Bill C-52 died on the order paper,
not having gone beyond First Reading, and the Mulroney government took the Penner Report in
a markedly different direction.

Under the reign of the Progressive Conservatives from 1984 to 1993, program devolution came
to be seen as the gateway to First Nation self-government. The Penner Report recommendations
for constitutional entrenchment of self-government and the passing of legislation to implement
this right were largely forgotten.

Internal INAC documents from this period characterize

devolution as falling along a ‘continuum’ from “simple devolution” to “full devolution.”67
“Simple devolution” was conceived as essentially the delegation of INAC program
administration.68 “Full delegation” was conceived as self-government.69
At this time, funding agreements became the cornerstone of the government’s approach to the
‘continuum of devolution.’ In this regard, it is important to note that there various ways that the
federal government can disburse moneys to third parties, including via:

Contribution agreements - Contributions are either advance payments or reimbursements
of eligible expenditures incurred by the recipient for an agreed purpose.

Eligible

expenses are defined in the contribution agreement and must be made in the pursuit of
defined performance requirements. They are subject to audit, evaluation and reporting
requirement.70
Grants - Grants are transfer payments requiring less accounting and oversight. 71 In more
recent years, Canada has begun to place conditions on grants, though the classic model of
grants is that of being unconditional. Instead of meeting strict conditions, recipients are
expected to provide an understanding of the use to which the funds will be put. Grants
Cumming, P.A., and Ginn, D., “First Nation Self-Government in Canada” (1986) Nordic Journal of International
Law 55.1-2 86 at 100-107.
67
INAC, “Overview – Devolution Task Force” (Draft – 17/3/92) (National Archives).
68
Ibid.
69
INAC “Devolution” (Draft – 9/8/92) (National Archives).
70
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, From Red Tape to Clear Results – The Report of the Independent Blue
Ribbon Panel on Grant and Contribution Programs, December 2006, ISBN: 978-0-662-49799-8, at 3.
71
Ibid. at 20.
66
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are usually not audited, though perhaps subject to some reporting or disclosure
requirements.72

Intergovernmental transfers - Contribution and grants are the key funding mechanism
Canada uses to transfer funds to businesses, not-for-profits, individuals, as well as to
provincial, territorial and municipal governments in some instances.73 Beyond these,
there are also inter-governmental transfers between Canada and the provinces and
territories, and these are for such things as equalization payments and the social and
health transfers to the provinces and territories.74 Such transfers are unconditional and
the lines of accountability for spending these funds are between the government receiving
the funds and its citizens. The provinces receiving the payments are free to spend the
money in accordance with their own priorities.75

Up until the mid-1980s, all devolution of programming to First Nations was transferred through
contribution agreements which puts tight controls on how funds are to be spent. Contribution
agreements require reimbursement of actual costs and do not allow First Nations to retain or
carry forward any surpluses at the end of a fiscal year. 76 Any surpluses must be returned to
Canada at the end of the fiscal year.

The Penner Report had been harshly critical of the use contribution agreements given their
restrictiveness and focus on accountability between First Nations bands and INAC, instead of
between First Nation bands and their members. As an alternative, the Report urged for the use of
unconditional grants or intergovernmental transfers, in tandem with its call for legislation
implementing

self-government.77

The

Mulroney

government

largely

ignored

this

recommendation, and instead sought to address the problem by examining how contribution
agreements could be made more flexible and promote greater First Nation accountability to
membership.
72
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Thus, in the late 1980s, the Treasury Board of Canada approved two additional funding
mechanisms specifically designed for First Nations, the flexible transfer payment (FTP) and the
alternative funding arrangement (AFA).78 These arrangements also allowed for First Nations to
have one single arrangement on devolution as opposed to a number of separate contribution
agreements for each devolved program.79 The main features these mechanisms are as follows:
Flexible transfer payments (FTP) – allows First Nations to retain surpluses generated
from a particular program (except income assistance) provided the minimum program
requirements are met. The intention behind this ability to retain surpluses was to create
an incentive for First nation to more effectively manage their programs to ensure surplus
at the end of the year. Surpluses could be retained for use at the Band Council’s
discretion.80
Alternative funding arrangements (AFA) – provides five year funding and the flexibility
to transfer funds across programs in addition to the ability to retain surpluses (and the
responsibility for deficits). To be eligible for such agreements, First Nations must meet
various entry requirements. Funding is also conditional upon meeting individual program
terms and conditions. These are intended to provide First Nations some control over
meeting community needs and priorities by giving First Nations the opportunity to
enhance programs by using any generated surplus, transferable across different
programs.81

Using the four types of funding mechanisms available in different combinations—grants,
contributions, FTPs and AFAs—into the 1990s and beyond, INAC essentially began to offer two
types of funding agreements to First Nations:

INAC, Income Assistance Program – National Manual, 2005, supra note 23 at 15; see also INAC, Departmental
Audit and Evaluation Branch, “Evaluation of the Alternative Funding Arrangement (AFA) and Flexible Transfer
Payment (FTP) Funding Authorities”, December 2005 (“2005 Evaluation Report”) at 12.-13.
79
IOG Report, supra note 76 at 11.
80
Ibid. at 13; see also 2005 Evaluation Report, supra note 78 at 12-13.
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1) Comprehensive Funding Agreements (“CFAs”) – these are made up of a combination of
grants, contributions and FTPs for a variety of programs and services, and have a term of
one year. This means that for some programs covered under FTP, the Band would retain
any surplus, and for other programs covered under contribution (e.g., income assistance
and other programs), Bands cannot retain any surplus.
2) Block Funding Agreements (“Block Agreements”) – these are made up of a combination
of grants, contributions, FTPs and AFAs for a variety of programs and services. These
can be multi-year agreements.

For those programs funded under AFA, transfer of

surpluses between programs is possible. Such agreements can be limited to only INAC
programs (in which case, they are called DIAND First Nation Funding Arrangements
(DFNDAs) or encompass funding from both INAC and federal departments, such as
Health Canada (in which case they are called Canada First Nation Funding Arrangements
(CFNFAs).82

To be eligible for Block Agreements, Bands are assessed for their

suitability to enter such agreements.83

Although having different names and some special features, it is important to appreciate that
these funding mechanisms are still in the nature of contribution agreements.

Despite allowing

some flexibility and retention of surplus funds, use of those funds remains conditional upon First
Nations adhering to the minimum terms and conditions for each program.84 Such program term
and conditions are those set by treasury board approvals, which, as discussed above, for virtually
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IOG Report, ibid. at 13-14. In 1986, consistent with what was happening within INAC, Health Canada also
announced its “Indian Health Transfer Policy” proposing to devolve health services to First Nation. See Culhane
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every essential service on reserve requires ‘comparability’ with provincial and territorial
standards, as well as any additional requirements imposed by INAC policies.85

Furthermore, both types of agreements impose reporting and accountability requirements on First
Nations, as well as provisions permitting INAC’s intervention in a First Nation’s financial
administration of its affairs in the case of default under the agreements.86

The funding

agreements require First Nations to submit numerous reports on spending for different programs,
and whether these are monthly, quarterly, or annual depends on the program terms and
conditions, as well as the type of funding (CFA or Block Agreements). In addition to these
reports, the agreements require First Nations to prepare annual consolidated financial statements
and disclose these to community members upon request, in addition to the Band’s conflict of
interest policy, annual report of activities, and fiscal plans.87

Where a First Nation is found in default, the agreements provide for three escalating levels of
intervention, which go from the First Nation having to implement a remedial management plan,
to the imposition of a Department-appointed co-manager, who works with the First Nations in
managing their financial affairs, or Department-appointed third part-manager in the worst case
scenario, who completely takes the First Nations’ financial administration.88 A 2013 INAC

For example, INAC’s First Nation and Tribal Councils National Funding Agreement Model for 2016-2017
incorporates by reference the following policies: (1) the Band Employee Benefits Program Policy; (2) the Band
Support Funding Program Policy; (3) the Professional and Institutional Development Program Guidelines; (4)the
Indian Registry Report Manual; (5) the Elementary and Secondary Education Program National Program
Guidelines; (6) the High-Cost Special Education National Program Manual; (7) the New Paths for Education
National Program Guidelines; (8) the Success Program National Program Guidelines; (9) the Education
Partnerships Program National Program Guidelines; (10) the Summer Work Experience Program; (11) the Skills
Link Program National Program Guidelines; (12) the Post-Secondary Student Support Program and University and
College Entrance preparation Program National Program Guidelines; (13) the Post-Secondary Partnerships
Program National Program Guidelines; (14) the First Nation and Inuit Cultural Education Centres Program
National Program Guidelines; (15) the Social Programs – National Manual; (16) the Lands and Economic
Development Services Program Guidelines; (17) the Land Management Manual; (18) the Community Opportunity
Readiness Program Guidelines; (19) the Strategic Partnerships Initiative Program Guidelines; (20) the Protocol for
AANDC-Funded Infrastructure; (21) the Interim Resources Management Assistance (IRMA) Program Guidelines;
and (22) DIAND Search and Recovery Guidelines.
86
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not met; (2) where the auditor gives an adverse opinion on the financial statement of the First Nation; (3) where the
First Nation has a cumulative deficit equivalent to 8% of the total revenues; or (4) where the health, safety or
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Directive 205 – Default Prevention and Management now also identifies the possibility that
INAC can terminate a funding agreement.89

This model of devolution has largely remained the same since the late 1980s. INAC has made
some changes to the funding mechanisms and agreements since this time, but these can be
mainly characterized as tweaks to the existing framework, rather than substantial changes to the
nature of these agreements.90 In recent years, under Stephen Harper’s Conservative government,
many of these changes involved a tightening of controls over First Nations.

In 2010-2011, the existing agreements were consolidated into one funding agreement model
called the Aboriginal Recipient Funding Agreement (“ARFA”), containing identical general
provisions, such as on reporting and disclosure obligations and default provisions, with the
selection of either CFA versus Block conditions made pursuant to schedules in the agreement.91
The ARFA considerably modified what had previously been the most attractive feature of Block
Agreements, which was the ability for First Nations thereunder to retain surplus funds from other
programs and have the flexibility to use these to enhance existing programs or redesign/establish
programs to meet community priorities.92 In effect, the ARFA imposed a requirement that, in
order to use surplus funds, First Nations would have to obtain the permission of INAC.93 In

89

This raises an alarming question about how First Nation community members would receive essential services.
The Directive states, in such situations, INAC will “take other actions as the Responsible Official deems necessary
under the circumstances to minimize impacts on the service population and protect the public's interest”, but the
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2013-2014, INAC loosened this requirement to some extent, exempting expenditures “on a
program, service or activity that is similar to and has the same purpose” of an existing program
under the Block from the requirement to obtain INAC pre-approval.94

The ARFA also introduced additional accountability measures from previous agreements,
introducing a requirement for First Nations to retain all financial and non-financial records for
each program, service or activity funded under the agreement for a period of seven years and the
ability for INAC or any other funding federal department to undertake an audit in order to
assessment First Nations compliance with a given agreement, or review the First Nations’
program management or financial control practices.95 It also requires First Nations to prepare a
budget for each fiscal year, and to disclose such to community members upon request.96

In addition to the above controls, in 2011-2012, the Department, under the Harper government,
introduced a further level of oversight to this system requiring each First Nation recipient of such
funding agreements to annually undergo a “General Assessment.” These are analysis undertaken
by INAC staff, using a “General Assessment (GA) Workbook” for each First Nation recipient (of
which there are over 600).97 Staff carry out these assessments independently from the First
Nations, with the First Nations given 30 days to review and comment on these once they are
completed.98 From these assessments, the Department then labels each First Nations as either
“low”, “medium” or “high” risk. These findings can affect which type of funding agreement a
First Nation can be eligible for, and their duration, as well as the recipient’s reporting
requirements.

First Nations labelled “low risk” may be required to submit fewer reports.

Conversely, those labelled “high” or “medium” risk may be subject to more frequent and
invasive departmental monitoring and reporting requirements.99

Amending Agreement for Subsequent Years of an ARFA/NARFA for Fiscal Year 2013/2014, Schedule “DIAND1A” Block Contribution Funding.
95
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In 2013, the Harper Conservative government also passed the First Nations Financial
Transparency Act requiring all First Nations to annually publish their consolidated financial
statements on their websites, failing which INAC could withhold any moneys payable under a
First Nation’s funding agreement, or impose remedial action up to terminating such
agreements.100 Prior to this, the annual audits submitted by bands under their contribution
agreements were generally subject to the Access to Information Act, but a band could refuse
access to non-band members where the requested audit contained confidential information
concerning the band’s private commercial transactions, financial holdings or own source
revenue.101 Some First Nations objected to the First Nations Financial Transparency Act’s
intrusive requirement to publish information unrelated to the expenditure of public funds on the
internet and challenged this in the courts.102 As of January 2016, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal
government had ceased enforcing the Act and said it would work in partnership with First
Nations on a way forward to improve accountability and transparency.103

The growth of program devolution to First Nations from INAC (as well as other departments,
such as Health Canada) over the past few decades has been significant. For example, in 1971,
16% of INAC’s total budget was administered by First Nations. By 1976, this rose to 31%,
which increased to 50% by 1983,104 and 75% by 1992.105 In 2015, 86% of the Department’s
budget consists of funding transferred to First Nations (and others).106

3. Program devolution is not self-government

Although at the point when program devolution began to be formalized in the 1980s, the
Mulroney government envisioned devolution as extending all the way to self-government under
the ‘continuum of devolution’, what has existed as devolution since this time is not self100
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government. While there are varying definitions and models of First Nation self-government, its
core feature is the existence of real decision-making power resting in the hands of Indigenous
peoples.107 It is difficult to see how First Nation program devolution as it exist in Canada today
can be characterized as providing real decision-making powers where the federal government
controls program standards and funding, which in turn are based on provincial comparability.
The Penner Report clearly recognized that devolution is not self-government: “control over
programs, policies and budgets remain with the Department.”108 Shewell and Spagnut have
observed that, while program devolution is an improvement over the past when social services
on reserve were only provided on an ad hoc basis, it is “a long way from Indian autonomy and
control over their own programmes.”109 Judith Rae argues that instead of “self-government”,
program devolution is better characterized as “self-administration” or “self-management.”110
The Federal Court of Appeal has also characterized program devolution as “selfadministration”.111

It is not only the fact that First Nations must adhere to provincial comparability standards that
makes devolution a far cry from self-government. First Nation contribution funding agreements
impose conditions beyond comparability, such as numerous reporting and disclosure
requirements. Under funding agreements, INAC can intervene in a band’s management of its
finances, to varying degrees up to imposing a third-party manager or even terminate a funding
agreement. All of this point to the clear conclusion that it is Canada who is very much in control
under program devolution and not First Nations. All of these features make up the current
system for program delivery (CSPD) on reserve.
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4. The persistence of CSPD despite calls for self-government
Here, I detail how CSPD has managed to persist despite calls from First Nations since the
withdrawal of the White Paper for recognition of their inherent right to self-government and
several attempts to move Canada towards self-government.

First, there was the entrenchment of s 35 in the Constitution Act, 1982, only inserted after intense
pressure from Aboriginal leaders, which recognizes and affirms the Aboriginal and Treaty rights
of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, but is silent on the right to self-government.112 Even now,
after 30 years of jurisprudence interpreting s 35, it remains unclear whether the right to selfgovernment is right protected by s 35. In R. v. Pamajewon (1996), the Supreme Court held
“without deciding that s 35(1) includes self-government claims” that if self-government was
included in s 35, any such rights would have to be proven by the same test used to prove other
Aboriginal rights, established in R. v. Van der Peet (1996).113 This test requires proof that the
precise subject-matter over which the First Nation legislates is (1) a subject over which the
ancestors of the First Nations governed prior to contact with Europeans; and (2) such governance
was integral to the distinctive culture of the First Nation. The restriction placed on the right of
Aboriginal self-government in Pamajewon has been roundly criticized as unduly limiting First
Nations’ ability to self-govern.114 The Court has yet to revisit its ruling, although it has had at
least two opportunities to do so.115
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Second, there was the 1983 Penner Report, which as noted earlier, was extremely critical of
devolution and called on the government to immediately implement self-government both
through constitutional amendment and legislation.116

Although Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal

government was receptive to the Report and introduced legislation incorporating many of its
recommendations, the government was replaced by Mulroney’s Progressive Conservation before
any the bill could reach second reading.117

Third, instead of getting rid of devolution, the Progressive Conservatives reacted to the Penner
Report by expanding devolution, seeing self-government as one end of the ‘continuum of
devolution’.

It did so by creating more flexible funding mechanisms in the late 1980s.

However, given that these mechanisms were nonetheless in the nature of contribution
agreements, they did little to move First Nations beyond self-administration.

Fourth, in 1992, following the total exclusion of Aboriginal people from the constitutional talks
on the failed Meech Lake Accord,118 Aboriginal groups’ insistence on participating in the
negotiations on the Charlottetown Accord would have led to an amendment to s 35 recognizing
Aboriginal peoples’ “inherent right of self-government within Canada.”119 However, the Accord
was put to a nation-wide referendum (the self-government provision being one of many proposed
amendments) and, unfortunately, failed.
Fifth, in 1992-93, the Progressive Conservative government committed to a “Phase 2” of its
previous devolution efforts, promising devolution of most of the remaining departmental
functions, including land, revenues and trusts services of the department with a significant
downsizing in INAC staff.120

However, plans changed course when the Progressive

Conservatives were defeated in late 1993 by the Chretien Liberals.
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Sixth, in 1995, the federal Liberal government implemented a formal policy recognizing the
inherent right of Aboriginal self-government.121 The policy, which is still in force, outlines 30
areas, divided into categories, in which Canada agrees that Aboriginal governments may exercise
jurisdiction. However, it does not allow First Nations to unilaterally implement self-government,
but instead mandates implementation only through negotiated agreements.
Seventh, in 1996, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP”) released a fivevolume report focusing on the need for a renewed ‘nation to nation’ relationship. The Report
concluded that Aboriginal people possess inherent self-government jurisdiction over core areas
including matters vital to the life, welfare, culture and identity of their peoples and local matters,
which could be exercised unilaterally by First Nations without negotiation with other
governments.122 To permit the implementation of these powers, the Report urged Canada to
embrace a new fiscal relationship with First Nations that replaced existing financial
arrangements with one that supported meaningful and effective self-government based on the
principles of self-reliance, equity, efficiency, accountability and harmonization.123 In this way,
First Nations would be become a third order of government.124

Eight, in 1998, the Chretien Liberals released its response to the RCAP Report entitled,
Gathering Strength – Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan, which committed, among other things,
to strengthening Aboriginal governance and developing a new fiscal relationship between First
Nations and Canada.125

By this, the government committed to providing Aboriginal

communities, “the tools to guide their own destiny and to exercise their inherent right of selfgovernment.”126 However, Canada remained unwilling to accept unilateral exercise of inherent
self-government even over core internal matters and continued to define self-government as
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“well-defined, negotiated arrangements with rights and responsibilities that can be exercised in a
coordinated way.”127
In addition to its unwillingness to embrace the RCAP Report’s recommendations on selfgovernment, the government’s attempt to reduce the deficit would also inhibit its ability to
realize RCAP’s recommendation for a new fiscal relationship. Around this time, the government
undertook a program review of all federal departments to find efficiencies in order to reduce the
deficit. All departments were expected to do their part to reduce spending. In the case of INAC,
the Department was reluctant to cut any core programs given the rapidly growing First Nations
population, so it agreed to a compromise that instead of program cuts, INAC funding increases
for 1996-97 would be limited to 3% growth and would be capped at 2% in the following years.128
The funding cap was only supposed to remain in place for a couple of years, but instead
remained in place for nearly twenty years until March 2016.129 A past Deputy Minister of INAC
has argued that the 2% was the primary reason why the RCAP Report never got the attention
from government that it deserved.130
Ninth, the Liberal government’s main initiative to deliver on its Gathering Strength commitment
to strengthening Aboriginal governance was by proposing national legislation in the early 2000s,
Bill C-7, the First Nations Governance Act.131 The bill was explicitly not intended to address the
inherent right of self-government, the delivery of programs or services, or a broad review of the
Indian Act, but “to provide the tools many First Nations leaders have called for to run their
communities efficiently and fairly.”132 The bill proposed to amend the Indian Act to require
bands to design and adopt codes for leadership selection, the administration of government and
financial management accountability. As well, the bill proposed to reorganize and ‘modernize’

127

Serson, supra note 125.
Ibid. at 152. See also Assembly of First Nations, “Fiscal Fairness for First Nations” (2006).
129
In December 2015, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government vowed to lift the cap, and in the March 2016 budget, the
governments did commit to funding beyond previous capped levels. See CBC, “First Nations welcome lifting of
despised 2% funding cap”, December 10, 2015 and APTN News, “Budget 2016: Trudeau Liberals blow 2 per cent
cap with ‘unprecedented’ $8.4 billion investment,” March 22, 2016. However, how the lifting of the cap will
immediately affect First Nations has not yet been clarified by the Department.
130
Serson, supra note 125, at 149
131
Bill C-7, First Nations Governance Act, 2nd sess., 37th Parl., 2002.
132
Library of Parliament Legislative Summaries, “Bill C-7: the First Nations Governance Act” (Ottawa: 10 October
2002, revised 18 December 2003).
128

26

the by-law powers under the Indian Act. Although it received some support, the Assembly of
First Nations and scholars were highly critical of the bill, charging that it had been drafted
without real consultation and accommodation, it posed and threat and was an infringement to the
inherent right of self-government, and it imposed more bureaucratic control over the lives of
First Nations people without resolving long-standing social and economic issues, such as urgent
needs in matters of health, housing and employment.133 Ultimately, given the resistance, the bill
failed to become law.

Tenth, although not explicitly a self-government initiative, the Liberal government, under Paul
Martin, in 2004-2005, led a series of roundtables between federal representatives, First Ministers
of the Provinces, Territorial leaders and the leaders of the five national Aboriginal organizations,
with the objective of closing gaps and raising the standard of living for Aboriginal peoples
(partly caused by the 2% federal funding cap) by 2016. This culminated with an accord signed
in November 2005, entitled, First Ministers and National Aboriginal Leaders: Strengthening
Relationships and Closing the Gap (also called the “Kelowna Accord”). The parties’ sought to
achieve better results in the areas of relationships, education, health, housing, and economic
opportunities, as well as to increase Aboriginal peoples’ capacity to participate in the
development of policies, programs and services that affect them. At the time, the Assembly of
First Nations noted that the Accord was the start of Aboriginal control over change ranging from
policy to the implementation of programs.134 The federal government committed $5.1 billion in
spending in this regard over an initial five-year period.135 However, the Martin Liberal minority
government was defeated in late 2005, and a Conservative minority government came to power
in 2006, under Stephen Harper, who did not proceed with the implementation the Kelowna
Accord.
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Finally, through the Harper Conservative government’s reign, few initiatives were undertaken to
further advance Aboriginal self-government through legislative action.136

Although

comprehensive claim and self-government negotiation tables continued under the Harper
government, some First Nations perceived progress under these tables to have virtually slowed to
a halt.137 (To date, only a dozen of such agreements have been signed since the 1970s.138)
Further, as noted earlier, under Harper, controls and accountability over First Nations increased
(and, consequently, First Nations flexibility and control over their own affairs decreased).

The pattern we see emerge over this period are fits and starts of attempts to advance First
Nations self-government and well-being, interrupted with changes in government. Beyond this,
especially both with the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives and Chrétien’s Liberals, we see
significant discomfort in embracing robust conceptions of self-government, seemingly based on
concerns that First Nations are not sufficiently ‘advanced’ enough for this. It is possible similar
concerns are also behind the Supreme Court of Canada’s very tepid recognition of selfgovernment to date. Meanwhile, through all these failed attempts to make changes, the current
system of program delivery (CSPD) on reserve continued unabated.

Part 2 - Key Problems and Harms with CSPD

Some have argued that self-administration, while not self-government, is beneficial for First
Nations because it nonetheless provides them with some autonomy, presents opportunities for
the development of capacity and increases the relevance of Aboriginal governments in the daily
life of communities.139 However, I agree with Judith Rae, who argues strongly in her piece,
“Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone or Quagmire for First Nations?”, that while
136
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devolution was perhaps well-intended and could have been beneficial as a transitional tool by
preparing First Nations for self-government through capacity building, it has been in place too
long and has led to a number of problems. Rae identifies these as including (1) poor program
quality and cultural mismatch; (2) entrenchment of a dysfunctional governance structure; and (3)
building inertia and further obstacles to positive change.140 She argues that because of other
unintended problems, including underfunding and weak progress towards genuine selfgovernment, program devolution is not functioning as a transitional tool to self-government, but
only making matters worse. It is a “quagmire” in which a dysfunctional, unjust and ineffective
system is entrenched, causing untold damage to First Nations people who rely on the system’s
programs and services, and creating its own obstacles to positive change.141

While Rae focused primarily on program devolution, I have chosen to discuss all aspect of the
current system of program delivery (CSPD) on reserve, including the comparability standard,
devolution, and the particularities of the funding agreements. While Rae attempted to illustrate
the problems with devolution by reference to two case studies (one on education and the other on
child welfare), my approach will instead be to attempt to exhaustively catalogue the myriad
problems and harms the CSPD it is causing First Nations.

1. Living conditions have not improved

As noted in the introduction, the Auditor General of Canada suggested that the CSPD has in fact
hindered improvements in living conditions on reserves.142 While there is little statistical data
available beyond 2011, numbers of suggest little marked improvement in the socio-economic
conditions of First Nations people living on reserve in Canada. While only making up 7% of the
population, Aboriginal children make up 48% of children in foster and permanent care.
Secondary school completion rate for First Nations students on reserve is only 49%. The number
of First Nations adults that live in overcrowded homes is 23.4%. Nearly 32.2% of household
water is unsafe to drink and 34% communities still get water by truck, from wells, or collected
from rivers, lakes or water plants. 37.3% of First Nation households require major repairs. In
140
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2006, the unemployment rate for First Nations people living on reserve was 25%, approximately
three times the rate for non-Aboriginal-Canadians. Suicide rates among First Nation youth are
five to seven times higher than other young non-Aboriginal Canadians.143

Community well-being index scores, tracked by the Department and based on the 2011 National
Household Survey indicate that, while national averages have been increasing across all types of
communities; the gap between First Nations and non-Aboriginal communities has been persistent
over the past 30 years remaining 20 points apart.144 Below, I reproduce the Department’s graph
charting the index since 1981. The gap between First Nations and Inuit communities is also
noteworthy. Although, First Nations and Inuit were virtually at the same index score in 1981,
Inuit have advanced several points beyond First Nations in the last 30 years. The gap may be
attributable to the fact that, unlike First Nations, Inuit have not been under CSPD. All but one
Inuit group in Canada have concluded land claim agreements with Canada that include selfgovernment provisions145 and these have led to improvements in Inuit well-being.146
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2. Problems with comparability standard
a) Premised on assimilation
As the history in Part 1 reveals, Canada’s primary program and funding standard on reserve,
namely provincial comparability, is rooted in the goal of assimilation.

While Canada’s

underlying justification for assimilation changed after the Second World War—going from
seeing Indigenous peoples as groups whose cultures needed be eradicated to Indigenous peoples
seen as being held back by their special legal status as “Indians”—the goal always remained the
same: First Nations’ absorption into mainstream society.

As seen in Part 1, throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, the federal Joint Committee
emphasized the integration of Indians into mainstream society.

Having the provinces and

territories assume greater and greater responsibility over Indians was key in this regard, although
31

the federal government came up short on persuading all but one of the provinces to do so. The
1964 Treasury Board authority authorizing the funding of services on reserve based on
provincial comparability was the federal government’s indirect manner of achieving what it had
failed to do directly via s 88 or Part II of the Canada Assistance Plan—get the provinces’ to
assume responsibility for Indians.147 Thus, although with its withdrawal of the White Paper,
Canada officially declared an end to assimilation policy in 1971, as observed by Shewell and
Spagnut, the policy of assimilation nonetheless continues to run through Canada’s program
delivery to First Nations based on the comparability standard:
Although the federal government dropped the legislative proposals of the White Paper the
program objectives remained in place. … What could not be accomplished through
legislation could still be done through the relentless expansion of federal and quasiprovincial programmes.148
In other words, the backbone of the CSPD—the comparability standard—perpetuates the policies
of assimilation and colonialism that have been with Canada since at least Confederation.

b) Leaves First Nations out of policy development

Under the comparability standard, First Nations are in effect subject to a government twiceremoved. Although the federal government has all the control, it abdicates a significant part of
this control to provincial policy. Provincial policy, in effect, determines rates, eligibility criteria,
services standards, etc., on reserve. However, the provinces have have no direct contact with
First Nations vis-à-vis legislative or policy reform because “Indians and lands reserved for
Indians” are not the provinces’ legislative or fiscal responsibility according to the Constitution
Act, 1867 and all provinces (except Ontario in regards to welfare) have refused to assume such
responsibility despite Canada’s urgings.
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When First Nations raise concerns to the Department about program policy on reserve, they are
told by INAC that it has no control over provincial policy and the First Nations are encouraged
by the Department to participate in provincial public engagement sessions if they have concerns.
For example, a presentation to Atlantic First Nations on income assistance on reserve included
the following slide:
As comparability to provincial rate structures forms the legal basis of INAC’s authority
to fund income assistance, these rates cannot be negotiated with INAC. Provinces retain
the authority to set their own rate structures for income support programs.
Each of the four Atlantic provinces has a public engagement policy in place. As
provinces entertain changes to their income assistance rates structures and/or program
criteria, there will be opportunities for public engagement and comment.149
This ‘passing the buck’ to the provinces, so to speak, to deal First Nations policy concerns, is
unreasonable and completely unresponsive to the needs of First Nations. The provinces have no
legal obligation to First Nations in the circumstances. As noted by Shewell and Spagnut, in the
context of social assistance on reserve:
[T]he fact that the federal government chooses to deliver Social Assistance according to
provincial regulations is only of incidental interest to the provinces. Because First
Nations are not direct recipients of provincial Social Assistance, whatever they might
think of provincial programmes is of little concern to the provinces.150
This situation leaves First Nations without any real means of effectuating changes in essential
services policy. Except in the case of child welfare legislation,151 provincial laws do not directly
apply to First Nations, and there is no legal basis for provincial officials to see First Nations on
reserve as interested stakeholders in provincial essential services policy.
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Furthermore, provincial legislatures are largely not representative of First Nations people (most
First Nations people on-reserve do not even vote, let alone run, in provincial elections152);
elected provincial officials are more often than not completely unaware of what life is like on
First Nation reserves; and the issues facing First Nations peoples are unlikely to be top-of-mind
when provincial legislatures debate social policy and laws, especially when provinces have no
legal responsibility for funding essential services on reserve.
Finally, even if First Nations were able to convince the provinces to consider First Nations’
particular policy concerns with provincial legislation out of the sheer goodness of their hearts,
the constitutional doctrine that prevents provincial laws from ‘singling out’ Indians, that is,
creating specials rules for Indians (whether for ameliorative or adverse purposes), likely limits
the extent to which provinces can accommodate First Nations interests.153

c) Not culturally appropriate

Provincial essential services laws tend to be informed by Euro-Canadian concepts such as
capitalism, liberalism, individualism and other Western values. Such concepts are very different
from the primary concepts that traditionally informed Indigenous communities’ worldview and
legal traditions and which survive today despite colonialism, such as kinship ties,
interrelatedness and reciprocity, to name a few. It should not be surprising, therefore, to discover
that imposing services on First Nations based on concepts from a foreign value system may not
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work or ‘fit’ very well.

Shewell & Spagnut forcefully make this point specifically with

regarding the imposition of provincial welfare standards on First Nations:
…the idea that Indian poverty can be relieved and solutions found through Euro-Canadian
welfare state measures was, and is, a profoundly ethnocentrically misguided assumption
[references omitted]. Historically, like any independent and economically self-sufficient
peoples, First Nations had their own ways of coping with times of scarcity and hardship. …
The main impact of the Euro-Canadian Social Assistance programme has been its
individualization of poverty and the undermining of collective and traditional patterns of
helping, sharing and co-operation centred on interconnected kinship systems… 154
In a similar vein, the Assembly of Fist Nations has criticized the imposition of provincial social
assistance rules as perpetuating a colonial form of dependency and keeping First Nations in
poverty.155

Patrick Johnson details how, with respect to child rearing, First Nations have a distinct and
unique value system manifested in customs and traditions that have been passed down from
generation to generation, and these approaches to child rearing may still prevail in First Nations
communities.156 He names many, but among these include a pacifistic approach to socializing
and disciplining children, often seen negatively by Europeans as “permissive” parenting,157 and
having a broader concept of ‘family’ that includes grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, etc., and
all play a role in raising children.158 Johnson argues that differences in values between First
Nations and Europeans contributes to the problems in First Nations child-welfare:

A system of child welfare is based on certain beliefs held by members of the dominant
culture. Those beliefs evolve into normative standards of child rearing and define which
practices should be considered good or bad, proper or improper. A problem arises if one
set of standards is applied to a group with a different set of norms. Several observers
154

Shewell & Spagnut, supra at note 16 at 41-42. The authors further point out how the underlying principle of the
Euro-Canadian welfare system—access to the job market—is largely impractical in the context of First Nations,
since many First Nations live in remote areas with little to no access to the job market.
155
Quoted in Papillon, supra, at 8. See also INAC, Departmental Audit and Evaluation Branch, “Evaluation of the
Alternative Funding Arrangement (AFA) and Flexible Transfer Payment (FTP) Funding Authorities”, December
2005, at 25-26, where First Nations surveyed commented that social assistance proliferated dependency rather than
providing a positive funding source for training or other programs to improve economic and social circumstances of
the communities.
156
Johnson, supra note 33 at 71.
157
Ibid. at 68.
158
Ibid. at 69.

35

have suggested that this is precisely what has happened to Native people, not only in
Canada but in other countries as well, as they come into contact with child welfare
services. A different approach to child rearing may have resulted in Native people
receiving inappropriate and, perhaps, even discriminatory treatment by the child welfare
system.159
In a similar vein, Dr. Cindy Blackstock has argued that, in addition from underfunding of the
services, the imposition of provincial child welfare laws on reserve is also inappropriate and
harmful:
In an effort to stem the tide of removals, First Nations mobilized and began establishing
their own child welfare agencies in the 1970s. … [However] these agencies must wear
the straightjacket of provincial legislation and federal government funding regimes that
are often not culturally appropriate and are rarely grounded in research evidence relevant
to First Nations. It would be reasonable for provincial and federal governments to
impose child welfare policy and practice on First Nations child welfare agencies if they
could muster evidence of the efficacy of their solutions, but in the vast majority of
circumstances they have not. This wholesale imposition of provincial and federal child
welfare systems creates an untenable situation that stifles innovation in a system that
desperately needs it.160
Other have argued that the First Nations poverty paired with Euro-Canadian norms on child
rearing results in First Nations children being disproportionately apprehended on the grounds of
‘neglect’.161

Given its ties to assimilation and the comments about how provincial standards are not helping to
improve conditions and seems to be causing harm in some cases, the obvious conclusion is that
the comparability standards is not cultural appropriate for First Nations people. In this regard,
many First Nation witnesses before the Penner Committee in the early 1980s asserted that First
Nations control over key service areas was essential their cultural survival.162 Since this time,
many scholars have argued that implementing self-government would lead to practical
improvements in program delivery and improve well-being of First Nations generally, including
159
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in the areas of education,163 health services,164 child welfare,165 social assistance/social
development, among others.166 In this regard, John Hylton argues:
The conclusion of the analysis is inescapable—existing social programs that have been
imposed on Aboriginal people by the governments of the dominant society have failed
Aboriginal people and the Canadians who have supported them. Programs designed and
run by Aboriginal people for Aboriginal people, on the other hand, have generally proved
to be more effective and no more costly. This is one more reason Canadian public policy
ought to support the movement towards Aboriginal self-government.167
To build on Hylton’s point, there is a growing body of evidence that clearly establishes than
when First Nations can design their own programs and services, they achieve improvements in
their quality of life. For example, owing to a successfully negotiated a sectoral self-government
agreement, since 1999, Mi’kmaw people in Nova Scotia exercise legislative and administrative
control over primary and secondary education on reserves in the province.168 This has resulted in
high school graduation rates of First Nations students on reserve in Nova Scotia being double
(and in some cases triple) the graduation rates of First Nations students in schools on reserves in
the rest of the country.169

Martin Papillon also raises statistics showing that of Indigenous

groups in modern land claim agreements fare better in terms of well-being in terms of income
level, employment, housing and education than First Nations who remain in the current system
of program delivery on reserve.170
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3. Problems with contribution agreements
a) No say and no choice

Whether CFA or Block Agreements, First Nations largely have no say in the content of these
agreements. These are standard form agreements (also called adhesion contracts) prepared by
INAC and, as seen above, the Department may add tweaks at whim (or even more substantial
changes as seen in the case of the ARFA agreements). INAC sends new agreements to First
Nation bands by correspondence for review and signing. While these are sent in advance of the
expiration of existing funding agreements, as by found by an internal evaluation, INAC often
provides renewal documents too close to the signing deadline to permit for meaningful
discussion between the Department and First Nations (or to permit time for the First Nations
government to discuss the contents with community members).171

Hence, there is no real

negotiation, as observed by 2008 report undertaken by the Institute on Governance:
There is no real negotiation of funding arrangements with First Nations and Tribal
Councils. They are drawn up and delivered for approval by Chief and Council or the
Tribal Council with very little discussion. First Nations and Tribal Councils perceive it
as a "take it or leave it" proposition. Budgeting, allocations and formulae are not well
understood and budgets may be cut without warning. For most recipients, there is little
discussion of their plans or outcomes; little guidance on best practices; and little
opportunity to network and share experiences with others in the same region or across the
country.172
As noted by the report, the choice available to First Nations is really one of either ‘take it or
leave it’.173 However, the vast majority of First Nations who lack sufficient (or any) own sources
resources to sustain their communities, in effect, have no choice since these agreements control
the flow of funds to support basic, essential services programs that the community cannot do
without.

As stated by one First Nation in a news article on concerns about signing its 2013-

2014 CFA Agreement, “Now signing off mean we don’t get any dollars for our community for I
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don’t know how long. At the present time … we don’t have any economic opportunities as some
other First Nations communities do; we’re pretty isolated.”174 The fact that these agreements are
standard form (adhesion contracts), signed with no real negotiation and in the context of a power
imbalance between First Nations and Canada has been recognized in the courts:
[T]he AFN [Attawakpiskat First Nation] relies on funding from the government through the
CFA to provide essential services to its members and as a result, the CFA is essentially an
adhesion contract imposed on the AFN as a condition of receiving funding despite the fact
that the AFN consents to the CFA. There is no evidence of real negotiation. The power
imbalance between government and this band dependent for its sustenance on the CFA
confirms the public nature and adhesion quality of the CFA.175

b) No real flexibility

As noted above, Block Agreements were introduced in the late 1980s as more flexible funding
agreements for Bands, with the intent of promoting greater First Nations control and to build
capacity towards self-government. In essence, these agreements allowed First Nations, after
minimum program requirements were met, to use any surplus funds left over for program
enhancement or even designing supplementary programs. However, an INAC evaluation of
Block Agreements in 2005 found that inadequate funding of agreements resulted in few
surpluses being available for program enhancement.176 It was further found that, because First
Nations under Block Agreement bear the risk of paying for any deficits, and the main draw—
surplus flexibility—is illusory due to inadequate funding, First Nations are generally not opting
into Block Agreements.177 Thus, these instruments have done little to assist First Nations in
moving toward self-government even though they were designed with this explicit purpose.

Further, as noted above, in the last decade under the Harper government, there was a significant
shift away from permitting flexible use of surplus funds when INAC introduced a requirement
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for pre-approval of any plans for use of surplus in 2011-12. Similarly, although older versions of
Block Agreements specifically permitted First Nations to develop their own written policies for
program delivery (so long as minimum program standards were adhered to),178 INAC under the
Harper government went so far as to deny in court the fact that First Nations ever had the ability
to do so.179 As well, although Block Agreements were original designed to lessen monitoring
and reporting requirements on bands, they now impose just as many reporting requirements as
CFA Agreements.180 Thus, any flexibility that could be once said to exist in Block Agreements
is now long gone.

c) Too many reports and controls

As noted in Part 1, First Nations are subject to significant reporting requirements under their
funding agreements (and these are now largely the same between CFA and Block
Agreements181).

To this was added the requirement for each band to annually be subject to a

‘General Assessment’ in 2011-12, whereby INAC staff independently assess whether a First
Nations is either “low”, “medium” or “high” risk. These findings can affect which type of
funding agreement a First Nation can be eligible for, and their duration, as well as applicable
reporting requirements.182 In addition, in 2011-12, a clause permitting Department staff to
undertake discretionary audits for program compliance was added to the funding agreement
template.183

Evaluations carried out on behalf of the Department have repeatedly concluded that the reporting
requirements on First Nations under their funding agreements are excessive and onerous. 184 To
give a sense of the numbers of reports a First Nation must file with INAC, a 2002 Auditor
General’s report found that the average First Nation was required to complete 168 reports
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annually just to keep funding for basic services flowing to their community. 185 Since this time,
Canada has made efforts to decrease reporting requirements.186 For the year 2016-17, the
number of reports is down to 37, though about 30% of these must be filed quarterly or
monthly.187 Although an improvement over 2002, this is still not an insignificant number of
reports. In the recent words of the Department, although there were some reductions in reporting
requirements, “Risk-based compliance work, program reviews, internal monitoring and audits of
program and policy implementation will continue to be the standards operating procedure for
[INAC].”188 It bears emphasizing here that if reports are not received on time, this triggers a
possible default under the funding agreements and intervention by INAC up to or including
withholding funds or cancelling an agreement.

One of the problems identified with excessive reporting requirements has been strain on the
capacity of First Nations.189 In this regard, a 2008 evaluation report has noted that some First
Nations have many of their staff dedicated to full time to accounting and reporting for INAC's
funding rather than to the delivery of services to community members.190 A 2011 report by the
Auditor General of Canada echoed similar concerns and concluded that INAC attempts to reduce
reporting had been unsatisfactory.191 It has been further noted that the Department is constantly
changing coding and the format of forms to be filled out by the bands, and First Nation staff
having to constantly learn new approaches, which adds more complexity, confusion and time
spent on filing reports.192

A further frustration that has been noted is the occurrence of

INAC staff losing or misplacing reports and funding being halted because of INAC's error.193
Evaluations of INAC’s reporting requirements have also found that, although there is a
proliferation of reporting, the data obtained by INAC is not being used to help build sustainable
Office of the Auditor General, 2002 December Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 1 –
Streamlining First Nations Reporting to Federal Organizations, at 8.
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capacity within First Nations194 or to improve outcomes in First Nations communities.195 This is
corroborated by an independent study in 2013 examining the extent to which INAC considers
community-participation and cultural sensitivity in evaluating its on-reserve programs.196 It
found that INAC evaluations rarely focus on the program’s beneficiaries, and the
recommendations were not focused on long-term goals.

Instead, INAC was primarily

preoccupied with providing accounts to the federal governments on dollars spent.197

The

Institute on Governance has suggested that poor and irrelevant data analysis is depriving
Parliament of information that could be used to improve the circumstances of First Nation: “It is
difficult for Parliament to get a complete picture of what is being achieved, where there has been
progress, what the gaps are, and what measures are being taken to reduce the gaps.”198 First
Nations themselves have also questioned the value of all of their reporting to INAC, as they do
not receive any feedback on their reports and they are not being used to increase funding.199

In light of the above, one is left to question what value all this reporting serves, especially when
it appears (based on results now coming out of INAC’s ‘General Assessments) that INAC
characterizes over 75% of First Nations as being ‘low risk’.200

d) Lack of timely funding

A consistent problem raised with the funding agreements, in addition to reporting issues, is the
late receipt of funds by First Nations from INAC. First, there can be significant delays in
concluding agreements that result in delays in payment and jeopardizing First Nations’ ability to
implement agreed upon projects or programs.201 Second, often funds from the Department are
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late and do not arrive by the beginning of the fiscal year. As a result, First Nations can incur
large debt financing charges because funding is not provided on time.202

e) Not appropriate

A number of reports have been highly critical of using funding agreements largely in the nature
of contribution agreements to fund First Nations governments. The 1983 Penner Report argued
that in order for First Nation governments to effectively govern the affairs of their people, their
funding relationships with the federal government needs to be on the same level as transfer
agreements

between the federal

government

and provincial

governments,

that is,

unconditional.203 The Penner Report further observed that contribution agreements misplace
accountability as between First Nations and the Department,, instead of focusing on
accountability as between First Nations and their members.204 More recent reports have also
raised this problem.205

As noted earlier, the 1996 RCAP Report urged Canada to embrace a new fiscal relationship with
First Nations that replaced existing financial arrangements with ones that support meaningful and
effective self-government based on the principles of self-reliance, equity, efficiency,
accountability and harmonization.206 More recently, in 2006, an Independent Blue Ribbon Panel
tasked with evaluating Canada’s grants and contribution program, found that the use of
contribution arrangements with First Nations to be “fraught with problems and leads to a costly
and unnecessary reporting burden on recipients.”207

The Panel suggested that fiscal

arrangements with First Nations should be treated more like intergovernmental transfer rather
than typical contributions arrangements. 208
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The 2008 evaluation undertaken by the Institute on Governance concluded that contribution
agreements were not appropriate vehicles for funding First Nations. The Institute’s conclusions
were as follows:
Despite the centrality of funding arrangements to the Department and their importance in
terms of INAC’s relationship with First Nations, Tribal Councils and other Indianadministered organizations, we conclude that they are not appropriate. There is a lack of
clarity about the overall objectives of the funding arrangements, a lack of coherence
among programs and funding authorities that make up the arrangements, and no clear
leadership at INAC Headquarters. There is limited engagement of the recipients. The
movement of First Nations, Tribal Councils and other Indian-administered recipients
towards increasingly responsive, flexible, innovative and self-sustained policies,
programs or services is not being promoted.209
The Auditor General of Canada, in a scathing 2011 report, stated, “We see several problems with
the use of this funding mechanism [contribution agreements] for the provision of core
government services,” and going on to echo the same concerns raised by the Institute of
Governance above.210 Others have charged that Canada’s approach to funding First Nations is
“paternalism hidden in the form of rhetoric about increased accountability” and is hindering First
Nation’s advancement towards self-government.211

Despite several report raising alarm bells over a thirty year period, the Department seems
unwilling to consider real change. In 2011, the Department did commission a report to consider
alternative funding models that provide more flexibility. However, with obvious paternalistic
undertones, the report dismissed out-of-hand the suggestion that agreements

akin to

intergovernmental agreements could be appropriate:
[P]rovincial governments differ in some notable ways from Aboriginal governments.
Generally speaking, provincial governments:





Serve large populations, so benefit from economies of scale
Are responsible for delivering essentially a common set of public services
Serve residents with needs that are quite similar
Have access to well-qualified staff
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Have many years of experience in managing program delivery and timetested good-governance, assurance and accountability mechanisms in place
Raise most of their revenue from their own sources, rather than depending on
federal transfers.

Therefore, when the federal government transfers funds to provinces with few strings
attached, it can be reasonably confident that the money will be applied efficiently and in
the public interest. If it isn't, there is good reason to believe that the public will hold their
provincial representatives primarily responsible through the provincial institutions (e.g.,
Provincial Parliaments) and assurance bodies (e.g., Provincial Auditors General).
Arrangements that resemble federal-provincial transfers may work for a very few
innovative First Nations. But, according to Gusen, three main problems would persist in
most cases:
 The system would not respond well to inter-community differences in need.
 The accountability mechanism would not reflect the fact that almost all First
Nations' funding comes via the transfer and that they consequently have
almost none of their residents' own money to account for.
 The inadequate capacity to manage the full range of province-like
programs.212
As will be seen further below, problems in capacity within First Nations is largely a product of
inadequate federal funding; thus, it is a problem of INAC’s creation, which as seen above, then
relies on dismiss calls for reform! That is not acceptable, nor as seen below, does it appear
justified. Finally, the above report was also dismissive of the suggestion that non-conditional
grants would be appropriate for the majority of First Nations:
AANDC will favour the use of grants whenever appropriate and desirable, taking into
account the differences that exist in the risk profiles, capacities and other circumstances
characterizing [First Nations]. "Appropriate" and "desirable" refer to those [First Nations]
whose risk profiles, capacities and other circumstances established through such
instrumentalities as the General Assessment or certifications by agreed-upon third parties
recommend and warrant the use of grants. It may be realistic to expect that only 10-15%
of the over 600 [First Nations] currently funded through contributions may qualify, at
least in the first "wave".213
It should be pointed out that the assumption in this report that only 10-15% of First Nations
would have a low risk profile grossly underestimates what would later be the findings of recent
INAC - Audit and Evaluation Sector, “Special Study: Evolving Funding Arrangements with First Nations – Final
Report”, November 2011, prepared by Donna Cona Inc., at 39. The author was unable to find the referenced ‘Gusen
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‘General Assessment’ evaluations undertaken by INAC. Such evaluations have found that over
75% of First Nations are ‘low risk’. Basically, the whole tenor of the report is that First Nations
are not able to control their own financial affairs except under close supervision and control by
the Department. It smacks of paternalism.

4. No legislative framework

a) Violation of the rule of law: too much discretion

It is important to appreciate that both the comparability standard and program devolution exist
outside of any legislative framework. The system runs only on Treasury Board authorities,
INAC policies and funding agreements. No legislation or regulation specifically authorizes
INAC to provide these services in this way. The only law that can be linked to Canada’s
provision of services on reserve is the very general authorization given to the Department under
its enabling legislation, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Act, to act
in relation to “Indian Affairs”.214 Beyond that, there are financial acts, such as the annual federal
Appropriation Act and the Financial Administration Act, but these merely authorize
Departmental spending and have nothing to do with the substance of programs on reserve.215
Canada’s approach to providing essential services on reserve is in stark contrast from other
governments (namely the provinces and territories) who provide essential services to their
citizens. In every province and territory you will find legislation governing essential services,
from social assistance, child welfare, child care, and the provisions of health and education
services, to policing and emergency services.216 Such legislation, and regulations promulgated
thereunder, set out definitions of key program terms, the purposes of the legislation, eligibility
criteria for services, rates, factors that a government officials must consider when exercising
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discretion under the legislation, and dispute resolution mechanism (e.g., right of appeal, etc.),
among other things.217
Canada’s approach to essential services on reserve violates the rule of law. In particular, I mean
the rule of law understood as the “principle of legality”. This principle expressing the notion
that, within a legal system, published laws should exist in order to bind both ordinary citizens
and government alike. Having published laws serves to (1) protect against arbitrary exercises of
power by the government, and (2) inform citizens of the standards governing themselves and
others. This was the concept of the rule of law affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re
Manitoba Language Rights at paras. 59-60:
The rule of law, a fundamental principle of our Constitution, must mean at least two
things. First, that the law is supreme over officials of the government as well as private
individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power. …
Second, the rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of
positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative
order. Law and order are indispensable elements of civilized life. …218
The problem with Canada’s violation of the rule of law here is more than an academic one.
When there is no law, what exists in its place is discretion.219 Where a government official
possesses too much discretion, this can create opportunities for abuse of power. Such abuse of
power can take the form of arbitrary decision-making by a government official.220 As well,
perhaps less sinister but just as problematic, too much discretion creates opportunities for
significant variances in interpretation of key program terms and requirements by different
On the inadequacies of this approach in the context of First Nation education on reserve, see Mendelson, M., “A
Second Look at the First Nations Control of Education Act”, Caledon Institute of Social Policy, August 2014, at 3-4.
218
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219
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220
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government staff, leading to inconsistent positions, confusion and uncertainty, which can all
impact the quality and level of services received by the end user, in the present case First Nations
individuals, families, children and communities.

I would argue that the current system of service provision on reserve, given that it exists absent
any legislative framework, operates entirely on the basis of government officials’ discretion and
creates conditions ripe for (1) multiple inconsistent interpretations and approaches to key
program requirements causing confusion and uncertainty; and (2) abuse and arbitrary decisionmaking. I provide some examples below.

(1)

Conflicting interpretations of ‘comparability’

The fact that the Department’s ‘comparability’ standard is not defined in legislation has resulted
in a number of problems (some discussed here and further in the next section regarding systemic
underfunding of programs). In regards to being the main service standard for the delivery of
social assistance, recall that the 1964 Treasury Board called for adoption of “adopt provincial or
local municipal standards”, but a contemporaneous directive issued by the Department in 1964
called for flexibility in creating policy manuals based on provincial standards. 221 However, the
Department has interpreted its standard differently, and sometimes inconsistently, over the years.

First, it would appear that different regional offices of the Department have taken different
approaches to updating their policy manuals to conform with changes in provincial social
assistance rules. A directive from the Director of the Social Development Directorate at INAC
headquarters provides that regions are to automatically adopt changes in provincial programs.222
This appears to have been followed in the province of Alberta.223 However, this does not appear
to have been followed in at least both the Atlantic and British Columbia regions, where manuals
produced in the early 1990s have not been updated by regional officials for over two decades.224
221
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To be fair, what was happening in the Atlantic Region during part of this period, starting in 1999,
was a joint partnership between the Atlantic First Nations and the Department to develop a First
Nations-designed, culturally-based, social assistance manual for Bands in the region. 225 The
Department invested $15 million in this project.226 A draft of the final manual was submitted to
the Department in 2007, but by that time, the government had changed from the Liberals to the
Harper Conservative government. The First Nations did not hear anything further regarding their
draft manual until 2011 when they were advised that it was rejected due to the fact that its
content went “beyond program guidelines” (although Department staff had previously
encouraged and supported the First Nations in the creation of the manual).227

In the summer of 2011, the Atlantic First Nations were advised by Regional officials that the
existing 1994 regional manuals needed to be updated to be ‘compliant’ with program authorities
and, in this regard, the manuals would now have to mirror the rates and eligibility criteria of the
provinces.228 The Atlantic First Nations objected to this, claiming that the Department had not
consulted them on these changes and the changes would have severe impacts on the
communities, given that the Department now appeared to be taking a very narrow interpretation
of provincial services as not including services previously allowed under the earlier 1994
manuals, such as shelter and utilities subsidies. Although INAC staff, in internal documents,
recognized the changes would have adverse impacts including “lowering of amounts received by
income assistance recipients in many cases”,229 “reducing shelter and fuel subsidies”, attracting a
“legal challenge or human rights complaint”, causing “threats and harassment of staff in the
field” and causing an “increased demand on Child and Family services, and other social
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program” in the communities,230 the Department nonetheless maintained that these changes were
inevitable in order to be “in compliance” with its program authorities, namely the 1964 Treasury
Board authority.231 What all of this demonstrates is that the Department’s interpretation of
‘comparability’ changed drastically as between the earlier Liberal government and the Harper
Conservative government.

In what did eventually become a legal battle, entitled Simon v. Canada, the First Nations argued
that the Department’s position on being ‘compliant with funding authorities’ was arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was inconsistent with previous interpretations of ‘comparability’ under
earlier governments, as well inconsistent with attempts by previous governments to foster greater
control over programs on reserve.232

Under the previous Liberal government, INAC’s

interpretation of ‘comparability’ had been flexible and permitted some variance from provincial
rules in order to meet the particular needs and circumstances of First Nations, especially for
those First Nations in Block Funding Agreements.233 The First Nations were initially successful
in their court challenge, the Federal Court finding that the INAC had deviated from its earlier
interpretation ‘comparability’ and, in making the decision to change its interpretation, owed a
duty to the First Nations to meaningfully consult with them and study the impacts of those
changes in order to prevent harmful or unnecessary impacts. On appeal, however, the Federal
Court of Appeal ultimately accepted the interpretation advanced by the Harper government that
Canada’s funding authorities requiring mirroring of provincial rules with no flexibility and the
government owed no administrative law duties to the First Nations in returning to this
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interpretation.234 The result is problematic, especially given that it simply ignores the fact that
the Harper changes (even according to INAC staff) would have significant adverse impacts on
many extremely vulnerable and marginalized First Nations’ welfare recipients. The decision is
really unresponsive to the reality of programing on reserve.

It ignores the fact that most

government policies are capable of having more than one meaning, and also suggests that the
Department has no responsibility to consider how changes in interpretation might impact First
Nations’ well-being. The decision, in effect, endorses a very strict, assimilative interpretation of
‘comparability’, whereas the earlier interpretations given to comparability by previous
governments (both Progressive Conservatives and Liberals) attempted, to some extent, to carve
out some space for community-based rules.

It also illustrates how much discretion the

Department has and the relative ease with which it can make dramatic changes to programs on
reserve. Had the ‘comparability’ standard been defined in legislation and the Department wanted
it changed, at the very least, the government’s changes would have been subject to some scrutiny
through the legislative process.

As a matter of contrast (and further illustrating that INAC takes inconsistent positions on
comparability) in the Caring Society case, INAC had argued that—when it comes to funding—
comparability does not require the Department to mirror or provide similar service levels to the
provinces, but is only required to maintain comparable funding levels to the provinces.235 INAC
took a similar position with regards to providing assisted living services to a severely disable
teenager on the Pictou Landing First Nation.236

(2)

Retaliation for speaking out or raising concerns

As noted earlier, both CFA and Block Agreements are standard form agreements and not
negotiated agreements. First Nations are presented with the choice of either to ‘take it or leave
it’ when it comes to signing these agreements. However, given that these agreements flow the
funds for core community programs, like social assistance, housing, assisted living, and
Canada (Attorney General) v. Simon, 2015 FCA 18, leave to appeal den’d: Chief Jesse John Simon, et al. v.
Attorney General of Canada, 2015 CanLII 67635 (SCC).
235
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education, there is no real choice. Against this backdrop, changes made by the Department to
the 2013-2014 funding agreement model (at this point the ARFA), were particularly contentious,
with many First Nations from across the country raising different concerns with respect to new
language added to their agreements.237 Around this time, many communities were concerned
about how amendments to the federal Fisheries Act and the federal environmental protection act,
buried in omnibus legislation, would affect their Aboriginal and Treaty rights and protested that
these changes were made without proper consultation. They believed new language added to
their funding agreements would be used against them to argue that they accepted such
amendments (there is precedent for Canada taking this position – discussed further below).
Despite the protests, INAC was unwilling to make changes to the ARFA model. Although many
communities opposed the new language, most felt they had no choice but to sign.

Five

Saskatchewan First Nations refused to sign and were consequently placed into third party
management, meaning the Department did flow the money for program delivery into the
community, but overtook control of the Bands’ financial management.238 Another First Nation,
God’s Lake First Nation, submitted their funding agreement with a cover letter stating they were
signing under duress. The Band was told by the Department that it would have to retract its
letter or risk having its funding discontinued.239
Similarly, in the Atlantic region at the same time, Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqewiyik First Nations
were also concerned about language in their agreements that would seems to run contrary to a
court injunction they had successfully obtained to prevent cuts to social assistance (related to the
Simon case discussed above).240 Concerned that the Canada would argue that they ‘agreed’ to
the cuts by signing funding agreements, many submitted their signed funding agreements with a
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letter stating they were signed under duress.241 Like in the case of the God’s Lake First Nation
mentioned above, the Department advised those First Nations that their agreements would not be
accepted, and their funding not released, if submitted with duress letters.242 These are all
examples of abuses of power; First Nations have the right to raise legitimate concerns about their
funding agreements without having the withdrawal of funding being leveraged to silence them.
The examples also show the significant power imbalance that exists between First Nations and
the Department.

Another example of abuse of power is the case of retaliation against the Attawapiskat First
Nation. The case involved the decision of the Minister of INAC to put Attawapiskat in third
party management243 after the Band declared a state of emergency regarding the state of housing
and infrastructure on reserve. The First Nation alleged the decision was not based on financial
reasons, but was retaliatory since the First Nation’s Chief had stated in the media that the
housing crisis was as a result of inadequate federal funding for housing and that the Harper
government was attempting to blame the First Nation for the crisis in order to deflect the
allegations regarding funding. The Federal Court of Canada found the Department’s decision to
place Attawapiskat in third party management to be unreasonable since there was no evidence
supporting financial mismanagement by the Band to justify the imposition of third party
management.244

b) Little to no access to justice
Although some First Nations have been able to successfully challenge the Department’s abuse of
discretion in the courts, as in the Attawapiskat case above, this is the exception and not the rule.
There are likely many instances of abuse of power that go unchallenged. First Nations are
among the poorest and most marginalized people in Canada. Historic neglect and mistreatment
at the hands of government can create conditions where First Nations feel powerless to challenge
Globe and Mail, “Distrust of Harper government grow over First Nation funding rules”, April 1, 2013.
Although no news stories were specifically published on this, I have several emails from representatives of
Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqewiyik First Nations from this time period confirming this.
243
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government decisions.245 The current system is so entrenched, it is likely that many First Nation
take the abuses of powers, inconsistencies and incompetency by the Department for granted and
do not realize how dysfunctional the system really is.

Many First Nations also lack the financial resources to proceed with legal action. Judicial
review can easily costs in the tens of thousands of dollars, if not more, and Canada tends to
vigorously defend such actions and this can serve to increase legal costs significantly. If legal
fees can be used as an illustration, in 2012-2013 fiscal year, the Department had the highest
litigation expenses ($104 Million) of any federal departments (almost doubling the budget of the
second-place department, the Canada Revenue Agency ($66 Million)).246

It has also been

reported that Canada spent over $5.3 million in legal fees on the Caring Society decision
alone.247

Some First Nations have been dissuaded from seeking redress due to concerns that, by
proceeding with litigation, they may experience retaliation from government, such as the
government pulling out of self-government or other negotiations, or otherwise being subject
adverse treatment such as in the case of Attawapiskat.248 Dr. Cindy Blackstock, the primary
complainant in the Caring Society decision, in addition to be subject to government
surveillance,249 was also found to have been subjected to retaliation by the Department.250

Aside from the serious access to justice issues that are always present for First Nations, the lack
of a legislative framework with respect to core programming on reserve adds several additional
barriers to First Nations achieving resolution of concerns regarding the current system of
program delivery (CSPD) on reserve. To begin with, there are limited avenues for redress. The
template model for funding agreements has always included dispute resolution provisions. The
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current provision, however, does not allow First Nation to invoke dispute resolution to challenge
either (1) budget decisions made in accordance with program terms and conditions; (2) amount
of funding provided by Canada under the agreement; (3) audits or evaluations permitted under
the agreement; (4) default or remedial decisions; or (5) matters of policy.251 The breadth of these
exceptions essentially hollow out the alternative dispute resolution option and leave it
meaningless.252

The only options, then, are the courts as well as human rights tribunals. And here again there are
many problems. Certainly, the Caring Society decision is proof that human rights challenges
against Canada relating to the CSPD is a viable option for redress, but this is the first decision of
its kind and it resulted from nine-year battle, where Canada aggressively defended the claim,
seeking to block the complaint at almost every turn.253 But for the perseverance of Dr. Cindy
Blackstock and Assembly of First Nation, and the legal team that assisted them on a pro-bono
basis, things may not have gone as they had. It should also be noted that the Canadian Human
Rights Act contained a provision preventing complaints arising from the Indian Act until 2008,254
which, although not completely the case, was perceived by many First Nations to mean they
were banned from bringing any complaints under the Act.255 Since the repeal, there have been
more complaints filed by First Nations, including those similar to the Caring Society case
alleging systemic underfunding in program delivery, including in education and policing, which
have yet to be heard on their merits.256 However, the Act has its limitations. In one case, a Band
was prevented from proceeding with a complaint alleging systemic underfunding by INAC
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between large and small bands because it was unable to link this adverse treatment to a listed
ground of discrimination in the Act.257

Turning to redress through the courts, the types of legal challenges that can be made are also
limited. Attempts to address disputes between Canada and First Nations in this area based on
arguments on s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 15 of the Charter, or claims based in
Canada’s fiduciary duty, have all been unsuccessful to date.258

Arguments based on

administrative law arguments, namely breach of procedural fairness and substantive
unreasonableness have met with greater success,259 but there are problems here as well. First,
administrative law remedies can sometimes be ineffective in addressing the true scope of the
dispute between a First Nation and the Department. For example, in a case involving the
Thunderchild First Nation (one of the five Manitoba bands placed into third-party management
for refusing to sign their annual funding agreements due to significant concerns relating to
changes in language, as well as systemic underfunding), the Federal Court dismissed the First
Nations challenge.260 The Court found that INAC’s intervention policy permitted it to place
bands in third party management where they refused to sign and there was a limited duty to
consult about the decision to place the band in third party management. Thus, the Federal
Court’s decision was unable to address the broader justice issues the First Nations was concerned
about, namely unilateral and arbitrary action by the Department in changing its funding
agreements and chronic underfunding.
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Further, there been have cases where the courts have suggested that administrative law remedies
were not available due to the fact that INAC’s activities did not arise out of legislative
enactments.261 In these and other cases, government lawyers strenuously argue that because
INAC’s activities arise from the exercise of discretion and relate to policy, they are either
immune from judicial review, or INAC is entitled to a significant amount of deference. 262 Both
types of arguments have been discredited in more recent case law,263 and should not be given any
heed as they permit Canada to benefit from a state of affairs it has created by refusing to
legislate.

In addition to immunity and deference to discretion, government lawyers advance other
arguments related to the peculiar nature of service delivery on reserve in attempts to block
legitimate claims. For example, in one case (as alluded to above), Canada argued that the fine
print in First Nations’ funding agreements meant that the First Nations had ‘agreed’ to the
particular decision the bands were challenging in court (cuts to welfare) and therefore, their
claim was moot.264 In another case, Crown lawyers advanced the argument that the funding
agreements between First Nations and Canada meant that the relationship between them was
purely contractual in nature and therefore precluded public / administrative law challenges.265
Both arguments were ultimately unsuccessful, but there is always the risk that a future court,
with a judge unfamiliar with these issues, could easily accept such arguments.

Finally, these are extremely difficult cases to bring before the courts because of their sheer
complexity. There is no statute to easily point to in order to establish what the applicable rules
261
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are. Instead, there can be an overwhelming and confusing paper trail of dense, unclear and
inconsistent funding authorities, policies, funding agreements, departmental reports and other
departmental correspondence that form the record of decision. The record is prepared by the
Department. It can be difficult for even a well-meaning judge to make any clear sense from this
morass. Some judges are also very uncomfortable in wading into cases about government
decisions over program benefits and socio-economic rights, and would prefer to leave such
issues to the politicians. There is also a tendency of some judges I have observed, perhaps
unintentionally, to place reliance on the Department and their counsel and to trust the narrative of
events they present, even when there is documentary evidence to the contrary (buried somewhere
in multi-volume books of the evidence containing the record). This puts First Nations at a
significant disadvantage because they have no control over the evidence that is put forward. In
this regard, there have been recent instances of relevant documents the Department should have
produced coming to light near the end of, or ever after a case.266

All in all, the odds are stacked against First Nations when they attempt to pursue remedies within
the justice system challenging inequities and injustices within the current system for program
delivery (CSPD) on reserve.

c) Little Accountability or Oversight by Parliament

Apart from calls to legislate over self-government, discussed in Part 1, there have also been calls
for Canada to legislate over CSPD on reserve. The Auditor General of Canada, as early as 1994,
suggested that the Department should have clear and substantive legislative authority for
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carrying out major program activities on reserve, such as social assistance. 267 The Auditor
General would again reiterate the need for legislation over essential services again in reports in
2006, 2011 and 2013, respectively.268

The Assembly of First Nation has also called on the

government to provide “a legislative funding base to provide First Nation Governments with a
predictable and secure foundation upon which to make strategic decisions.”269
Despite these calls, Canada has done little to address these recommendations.270 Not having
legislation has allowed Canada to minimize its responsibility towards First Nations. For years,
the government has maintained that its provision of services on reserve is strictly a voluntary
exercise of the federal spending power done as a matter of good public policy, and that it has no
obligation to provide services pursuant its constitutional jurisdiction over Indians. 271 In court,
the Department has tried to maintain that is only a “funder” and the provision of essential
services on reserve is really a provincial responsibility.272 As noted above, the provinces have
largely eschewed responsibility for extending their services on reserve and, although the federal
government chooses to adopt provincial rates and standards, there is no legal basis for the
provinces (except with respect to child welfare legislation), to see Bands as a interested
stakeholder or to consult them. In the circumstances, there is very little accountability by anyone
to First Nations governments or communities.

It has been noted in several reports and

commentaries that this system also largely ignores accountability between First Nations
governments and its community members.273 The Institute of Governance, in 2008, also noted
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that there was nothing within the Department by way of accountability standards of INAC staff
towards First Nations.274

The formal lines of accountability created by the CSPD is that Bands are accountable to the
Department for the spending of program dollars and the Department, in turn, is responsible to
Parliament to account for its spending. It was noted earlier that the Department does poorly at
obtaining data on outcomes and consequently its reports to Parliament do not show where the
gaps are and where progress can be made.275 Among the dangers identified by the Auditor
General in 1994 of Canada not legislating over programs on reserve, was an undermining of
Parliament’s control and accountability.276 This is borne out by the observation about the quality
of reports going to Parliament from the Department; if Parliament is not getting regular reports
on outcomes (but only data on dollars spent), it cannot engage in a well-informed policy debate
about the programs it provides on reserve, what is the appropriate role for the Department and
whether it is meeting this role, and what long-term outcomes Canada wants to achieve in terms
of the well-being of First Nations. When this does not occur, debate on First Nation policy is
likely to be mostly reactive, responding to crises as they arise.277

5. Severe funding issues

a) A knowingly narrow approach to comparability

The issue here is a continuation of the problem identified above regarding no legislated
definition of the meaning of the ‘comparability’ standard; it is open to interpretation by the
Department and, when it comes to funding, it has not been interpreted in a generous way.
Although INAC says it provides funding for comparable services, indeed, several reports suggest
otherwise.
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Numerous Auditor General of Canada reports have found that the Department in fact does not
know—and does not track—whether it is funding a comparable level of services compared to the
provinces. A 1994 report on Social Assistance noted, “it is difficult for the Department to ensure
that eligible Indians living on reserve are receiving social assistance services comparable with
other recipients in the general population of the same province.”278 A 2004 report on Education
noted, “At present, the Department does not know whether the funding provided to First Nations
is sufficient to meet the education standards it has set…”.279 A 2008 report on Child Welfare
states, “We found that INAC has not analyzed and compared the child welfare services available
on reserve with those in neighbouring communities off-reserve.”280

A 2013 report on

Emergency Management on Reserves notes, “the Department does not know if First Nations
communities on reserve are receiving emergency services comparable to those available
elsewhere in Canada.”281 Finally, a 2014 report found that policing services on reserve are not
equal in quality and level of service to policing services found in off-reserve communities.282 In
a general 2011 report on “Programs on First Nations Reserves”, the Auditor General observed
that:
It is not always evident whether the federal government is committed to providing
services on reserves of the same range and quality as those provided to other
communities across Canada. In some cases, the Department’s documents refer to services
that are reasonably comparable to those of the provinces. But comparability is often
poorly defined and may not include, for instance, the level and range of services to be
provided.283
A 2005 evaluation found that base funding levels for many programs had not been amended or
reviewed for several years.284 There have also been findings of shortcomings in the funding
formula for specific programs. For example, in education, the funding formula is 15 years out of
date and does not cover many responsibilities associated with education services delivery, such
as curriculum development, standardizing teaching approaches, providing teachers’ aids,
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planning, education policy development and budgeting.285 Funding for teachers’ salaries on
reserve is low and has not been updated for some time, resulting in high turn-over and inability
to attract teachers with more than five-years’ experience.286 With regard to social assistance,
INAC budgets only cover reactive programs and not preventative initiatives such as
psychological and other support services, or employment training.287 With regard to child
welfare, INAC funding formulas are based on flawed assumptions on the percentages of children
in care and families using services, are not regularly reviewed or updated to reflect inflation /
cost of living, and underfund prevention services.288 Health transfers to fund public health
services on reserve have been criticized as not including funding for training of staff,
underfunding administrative costs and consequently preventing wage parity with health services
professional off-reserve, and not keeping pace with program costs or demand.289 As well, the
general funding for band management and administration costs, such communications, human
resources management, and information technology services, have also been found to be
inadequate.290

In a 2006 document entitled, called Explanation on Expenditures of Social Development
Programs, the Department described all of its social programs as “…limited in scope and not
designed to be as effective as they need to be to create positive social change or meet basic needs
in some circumstances.”291

It goes on to say that if it’s current social programs were

administered by the provinces this would result in a significant increase in costs for INAC.292

Aside from reports attesting to chronic underfunding, a quick scan of news stories in First
Nations communities the last couple of years reveals that underfunding of services on reserve is
frequently attributed a number of tragic events such as: a rash of suicides attempts and suicides
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in the Attawapiskat First Nation, Pimicikamak Cree Nation and Mushkegowuk Council;293 house
fire deaths in Pikangikum First Nation and Makwa Sahgaiehcan First Nation;
children with skin conditions on the Kashechewan First Nation;

295

294

an outbreak of

violence and murders in the

First Nations communities of Manitoba Keewatinowi and La Loche; 296 and drug and related
crimes in the Moose Cree First Nation.297 First Nation underfunding is also attributed in recent
news stories as responsible for: the dismantling of community policing services in the
Atikamekw First Nation and the Mashteuiatsh First Nation;298 little to no fire protection in most
First Nations’ communities;299 lack of progress in improving safe drinking water on reserve;300 a
public health crisis in 33 Northern Ontario First Nations communities;301 and severe
underfunding in First Nations schools.302

a) Exacerbated by 2% Funding Cap
The problems with the Department knowingly taking a narrow approach to “comparability” and
underfunding programs, have been further exacerbated by the 2% funding cap instituted under
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the Chrétien Liberals in 1996-97 discussed in Part 1. The funding cap was only supposed to
remain in place for a couple of years, but instead remained in place for nearly twenty years until
March 2016.303

The effect of the funding cap was to limit spending on core programs—education, child welfare,
income assistance, First Nation government support, housing, capital and infrastructure and
regulatory services programs304—to only 2% growth per year. The result was that funding for
these programs has not keep pace with the demands in First Nations communities given
population growth and inflation. Writing in 2009, Judith Rae details the impacts of the cap as
follows:
Given that the population of First Nations people relying on these programs has grown by
25 per cent in the same period, and inflation alone was 2 per cent per year, the effect has
been a marked decrease in the real purchasing power of the First Nations governments
who are providing essential social services to their citizens. In November 2006, Indian
Affairs itself calculated this decrease in purchasing power at 6.4 per cent, while the
Assembly of First Nations calculated a 15 per cent loss. The shortfall accumulated just
from the cap was over $1.3 billion in education- and skills-development alone, as of
September 2007. This is merely the amount that would be required to restore funding to
previous levels, let alone meet the actual needs or provide for ongoing development.305
As well, as noted earlier, the impacts of the 2% cap were particularly hard-felt by those First
Nations, who, exhibiting strong financial management, had been encouraged by INAC to enter
Block Agreements, which normally have five years terms. The budget for these bands was fixed
at the outset, based on population numbers and inflation at the time of signing. If there was an
increased demand on service (for an example, high birthrate, or new members gaining status), or
increases in program costs306 or inflation, the budgeted funding could not keep pace.307 As a
result, these First Nations could find themselves in a significant deficit (if not able to cover shortIn December 2015, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government vowed to list the cap, and in the March 2016 budget, the
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falls with their own-source revenue) and possibly in automatic default circumstances if the
deficit exceeded 8% of their operating budget.308 To make matters worse, at the time of renewal
of these Block Agreements, INAC does not review them with First Nations to ensure they met
community needs, but simply does a “roll-over”, that is, use previous budget calculations with a
2% budget adjustment.309 Although there is a clause in the Block Agreements that permits
budgets to be increased in “exceptional circumstances”, the reported experience of First Nations
who have attempted to invoke the clause is that “nothing seems to qualify.” 310

In the

circumstances, it is apparent why so few First Nations have opted into Block Agreements in
recent years, given the risks it creates for them.

How the 2% funding cap could remain in place as long as it has (20 years) is astounding. Serson
has also observed that caps placed on the growth of federal equalization payments, and health
and social transfers to the provinces during this period were lifted in short order and funding to
them has grown significantly; for example the health and social transfer increased by 33 per cent
from 2004-05 to 2009-10.311 After considering all possible rationales to explain this doublestandard, Serson concludes, “they lead to the unfortunate conclusions that the federal
government is practicing a subtle form of discrimination.”312 The Assembly of First Nation has
also argued that not having legislation over funding has contributed to the problem. Without
legislation, INAC can treat its budgets for core services to First Nations as ‘discretionary’,
allowing the Department to do what it wishes with such funding, including keeping the 2%
funding cap in place for two decades.313 Another example of INAC treating essential services
funding as ‘discretionary’ came to light in June 2015 when a leaked internal INAC document
revealed the Department had held back over $1 billion in approved spending for core services
over the previous five years.314 These examples are consistent with the theme examined above;
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that the unlegislated, discretionary nature of Canada’s current system perpetuates numerous
problems with the current system of program delivery on reserve.

6. Cumulative impacts

a) Promotes vilification and infantilization of First Nations

It should be painfully obvious by this point that First Nations and their leaders are trapped in
what now seems to be a deeply entrenched, dysfunctional system that is not of their choice and
over which they have no control. What is even worse is that First Nations leaders bear the brunt
of public perception as being responsible for this mess, and the more that the status quo persists,
the more it is used to justify why First Nations are not ready for the obvious alternative—selfgovernment.

Examples of First Nations being vilified in the media for being corrupt, incompetent, and
ultimately responsible for the poverty and social problems in their communities abound.315 One
need only read the comment section of any online news story about conditions on reserve to
become acquainted with this reality.

While there have been cases documenting fraud and

corruption by First Nations leaders, this is a small minority and by no means representative of
the ethics and commitment of First Nations leaders generally.316

As a brief aside, I note that while much of this animus comes from sectors of non-Indigenous
Canadian society, there are First Nations communities members who share some of these views,
at least with respect to the corruption and incompetence of First Nations leaders.

At the

community level, many First Nations people may not fully appreciate the extent to which their
National Post, Todd MacKay, “All politicians must disclose basic financial information - including First Nations
politicians,” Jan. 16, 2016; National Post, Lois Frank, Harley Frank and Todd MacKay, “First Nations leaders
benefit from transparency,” March 16, 2016.
316
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leaders are forced to operate within a dysfunctional and discriminatory system they don’t control,
and that the day-to-day problems they experience are the products of decisions made by people
in Ottawa and at regional offices of the Department. In the circumstances, it is understandable
that they would focus their anger and frustration at the leaders within their line of sight.317

A particularly nasty stereotype, that the CSPD seems to breed, is that large sums of taxpayers
money have been invested in First Nations communities (i.e., that ‘pots of money’ have been
have been thrown at First Nation issues by successive government over a number of decades).318
To someone on the outside, knowing little to nothing about First Nations and program issues on
reserve, this is perhaps what devolution may look like. (This is certainly not helped by media
who constantly cite spending in First Nations as being “in the billions of dollars” without
explaining (1) that this money is for basic essential services on reserve (and not charity), (2) the
number of communities and individuals served by this funding, or (3) that this funding is
insufficient.319)
For many who hold this erroneous ‘pots of money’ assumption, when they are confronted with
stories of abject poverty and related social and health problems on reserve, instead of questioning
their assumptions about the ‘pots of money,’ they instead prefer to believe that First Nations
leaders have somehow stolen or mismanaged the ‘pots of money.’320 This message is extremely
damaging to First Nations, utterly false, and yet still relatively pervasive. Indeed, it was a barely
concealed message in many statements and actions of the Harper government. As observed by
the Assembly of First Nations regarding comments made by then Minister of INAC, John
Duncan, during the Harper administration:
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After claiming that they are spending $10 billion and this is enough, the Minister adds
“let’s get value for the money we are currently spending.” If there is enough money, but
the results are so bad on the ground, the implication can only be that there is
mismanagement and corruption at the First Nation level. But none of it is true...321
Further, this type of thinking was clearly motiving the Harper governments First Nations
Transparency Act and the push for even tighter control within existing funding agreements.322

Less vile, but perhaps equally pernicious, an uninformed understanding of the CSPD works to
confirm paternalistic stereotypes that First Nations are not capable of managing their own affairs,
or, at the very least, are still ‘not ready’ to assume self-government.323 It permits First Nations to
continue to be infantilized as they have since Confederation. This is evidenced in both the
Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative and Chrétien’s Liberal governments’ unwillingness to
fully embrace calls by the Penner Report and the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples’
Report, respectively, for real self-government. Both governments’ proposed alternatives to selfgovernment, the ‘continuum of devolution’ under Mulroney and the First Nations Governance
Act under Chrétien, were premised on the assumption that First Nations were ‘still not ready’ for
self-government. This is corroborated by the comments of then Minister of INAC, Robert Nault,
in 2002 justifying taking steps amounting to less than self-government, when he said “we are
about 60 years away from achieving the full implementation of the inherent right [of selfgovernment].324 Like vilification, the infantilization of First Nations also deflects blame away
from the government for problems on reserve, because it is premised on First Nations (though
unwittingly, as children) being the source of their misfortune.325
If First Nations are ‘not ready’ for self-government it because they have been put in a system
that, while it purports to be building their capacity to become self-governing, is so dysfunctional
AFN, “Fiscal Fairness”, supra note 127.
See also Salterio and Evans, supra note 210, who argue that the First Nations Accountability Act “of animosity
and mistrust between First Nations people and the general Canadian population, blurring the reality that First
Nations have the skills to govern themselves.”
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and underfunded that it sets them up for failure. But what evidence is there that shows First
Nation are not ready for self-government? In spite of being hostages to a broken system,
according to INAC’s own ‘General Assessment’ data, over 75% of First Nations have been
appropriately managing their financial and administrative affairs. That First Nations are capable
of sound financial and administrative management is further supported by the 2008 Institute of
Governance study that found that, in 2007, 84% of First Nations required no intervention by the
Department for default under the funding agreements, and of the remainder, less than 2%
required third party management. Further, the overwhelming reason for intervention was debt
due to the 8% automatic default, 326 which as noted earlier, is often triggered due to the fact that
the growth of the budgets in Block Agreements have been capped at 2% since 1996-97 (with the
budget formula simply ‘rolled-over’ at renewal time), and have not been keeping pace with
population growth, program changes or inflation. In order words, most First Nations’ default is a
product of the system, not First Nation financial mismanagement or incompetency!

b) A Department without focus and a clear conflict of interest
Although the Department’s national program manuals set out program objectives that talk about
“improving well-being” for First Nations through providing comparable services to the
provinces,327 evaluations of the Department have found that INAC really has no clear objective
driving it with respect to administering this system. As noted earlier, it has been noted that the
data collected by INAC from its numerous reports is not being used to improve outcomes for
First Nations communities.328

This led the Institute on Governance, in its 2008 evaluation

report, to observe:
The policy objective related to funding arrangements is not clear. Is it to progressively
move [First Nations] towards self-government through the assumption of increased
responsibilities? Is it to achieve better outcomes by providing greater flexibility to those
that are closest to the provision of services, more knowledgeable about the needs of
communities or recipients, and more culturally sensitive?329
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As a first point, it bears pointing out that the lack of clear of objectives in this system is part and
parcel of the problem of having no legislative framework underpinning this system. If there was
legislation on program delivery on reserve, the objective of providing such programs would be
articulated either in a preamble, a purpose clause, or even through the legislative debates leading
to its passage. Department staff would be required to adhere to the spirit of that objective in all
their work. Not having legislation leaves the objective(s) of this system to the discretion of the
Department.

Second, as seen in Part 1, the initial objective behind devolution was to assist First Nations move
towards self-government. But the means of achieving this—funding mechanisms in the nature of
contribution agreements tied to the comparability standard—is in tension with that objective. On
the one hand, INAC staff are expected to be advocates and advisors to First Nations in their
transition to self-government, but, on the other hand, they are required to monitor First Nations,
ensuring they are compliant with minimum program standards under the funding agreements and
file all necessary reports and audits. The two functions are at odds with each other. The Penner
Report made this observation as early as 1983: “There is a fundamental conflict between the
monitoring and advisory roles of DIAND employees.”330
Not only is there a clash between the two functions, but an employee’s own pecuniary selfinterest would necessarily favour the function that ensures his or her continued employment. As
a Departmental employee, working towards First Nations self-government almost guarantees that
one is working towards putting oneself out of a job.331 On the other hand, monitoring First
Nations adherence to contribution agreements requires the expenditure of significant staff
resources. This would include: (1) creating and updating forms, (2) training and advising First
Nations on filing such forms and monitoring whether First Nations submit the forms, (3)
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analyzing the forms and producing reports, (4) ensuring compliance with program standards and
audit requirement and (5) now, as of 2010-11, carrying out individual General Assessment on
over 600 separate First Nations. The monitoring function necessarily requires a significant staff
complement.

There are many indications that, over the past 20-30 years, the Department has clearly come to
prioritize its monitoring functions over other objectives, whether that be assisting First Nations
transition toward self-government, or even, more simply, ensuring the system promotes the wellbeing of First Nations people. First, contrary to what was initially intended, the Department’s
staff has increased under devolution, not decreased.

Although part of the Mulroney

government’s plan regarding the ‘continuum of devolution’ was to significantly downsize the
Department’s complement of staff, this did not materialize.

Granted some downsizing did

happen in the 1980s-1990s (going from 8,000 employees in 1976 to 3,800 in 1992332), staffing
levels at the Department then began to rise steadily in the 2000s. In 2010, staffing levels had
increased by 42% since 1992 (to 5,371 employees). Although there has been some reduction in
staff since, in 2015, there were still some 4,684 employees at the Department (an increase of
23% since 1992).333 Thus, devolution has led to significant growth in staff since the mid-1990s.
Increases in staff means an increase in administrative costs and that more of the Department’s
budget is being diverted from direct investment in First Nations communities and into the
Department’s operating costs. The Penner Report’s warning of this danger went unheeded.334 In
2015, the Department spent over $1 Billion on operational costs, including staff salaries.335

Next, recent evaluations of the Department include staff observations that INAC resources are
increasingly being used for monitoring and compliance.336 They also include First Nations’
observations that INAC staff are focused on their policies and programs, not priorities of First
Nations.337

Ultimately, the evaluations conclude that the Department’s main focus is on

following up on reports, compliance reviews and audits rather than preventative or proactive
INAC, “The Deputy’s Notes on Devolution: The Next Step,” supra note 104.
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measures.338 The 2008 evaluation report by the Institute on Governance observed that this
remains to be the case “[i]n spite of years of criticism … about excessive and misdirected
accountability and reporting requirements.”339
Department has continued on undeterred.

And, even in spite of that critique, the
In 2013-14, the Department reaffirmed that

monitoring is its bread-and-butter work, stating that “Risk-based compliance work, program
reviews, internal monitoring and audits of program and policy implementation will continue to
be the standards operating procedure for [INAC].”340

My point here is that the status quo creates an incentive for Departmental employees to prioritize
monitoring activities over First Nations helping transition to self-government or otherwise
improving the well-being of First Nations. The Department and its employees are in a clear
conflict of interest under the current system. Because of this, one can also expect that the
Department will be very resistant to any reform of this system, because it directly benefits INAC
staff by keeping them employed.

Part 3 - The Caring Society decision and its implications for CSPD
Part 2 reviewed the serious problems and numerous harms caused by the current system for
program delivery (CSPD) on reserve that render it completely unacceptable. These problems
and harms have been known for some time (the 1981 Penner Report identified most of them).
Yet First Nations experience significant barriers in attempting to break free of the CSPD and
move towards the only real alternative, self-government. Here I explore how the Caring Society
decision finally provides with First Nations with the legal arguments to bring about the end of
CSPD.
1. Summary and key findings of the Caring Society decision

The Caring Society complaint was filed with the Canadian Human Rights Commission in 2006
by the Assembly of First Nations and Dr. Cindy Blackstock, Executive Director of the Caring
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Society, on behalf of First Nations children and families.

The Commission referred the

complaint to Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) in October 2008. The complaint
faced several procedural challenges raised by Canada, including an attempt to prohibit the
Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (“APTN”) from recording the hearing, and to dismiss
the case on the basis that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear complaint under the Canadian
Human Rights Act.341 The decision of the Tribunal was released on January 26, 2016. Canada
will not be appealing the decision.

Specifically, the case alleged that funding of child welfare services on reserve by INAC pursuant
to the First Nations Child and Family Services Program (FNCFS) is inequitable and insufficient.
Reports cited in the case estimated that services for child welfare on reserve receive 22% less
funding than provincial child welfare programs.342

The Tribunal’s decision spans 494

paragraphs and is over 170 pages long. The Tribunal reviewed numerous reports from the
Auditor General of Canada, the Assembly of First Nations and from the Department, both public
and internal, as well as heard from several witnesses. It concluded from this significant body of
evidence that the funding models used by INAC do in fact significantly underfund child welfare
services on reserve and this creates incentives to remove children from their homes as a first
resort rather than as a last resort.343 More specifically, the harms identified by the Tribunal
included:

(1) inadequate funding formulas based on flawed assumption of First Nation families’
needs;344
(2) funding formulas that do not keep pace with inflation and cost of living;345
(3) arbitrary denials by the Department to fund similar kinds of prevention services available
within provincial systems;346
341
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(4) failure to study and failing to ensure First Nations receive levels of service comparable to
the provinces/territories, despite several reports suggesting the services are not
comparable and the Auditor General recommending a comparative (gap) analysis;347
(5) failure to ensure First Nations receive culturally appropriate services;348
(6) failure to ensure coordination between child welfare and other core federal programs,
including Income Assistance, Assisted Living, Non-Insured Health Benefits, etc.,
resulting in service gaps, delays and denials for First Nations children and families;349
and
(7) the cumulative effect of these adverse impacts is to perpetuate the historical disadvantage
and trauma suffered by Aboriginal people, in particular as a result of the residential
schools system.350

The Tribunal found these denials and adverse impacts were based on the protected characteristics
of race and/or national ethnic origin as the child welfare program is specifically aimed at First
Nations living on reserve.351

Simply stated, the Tribunal found INAC’s conduct was

discriminatory because it “widens the gap between First Nations and the rest of Canadian society
rather than narrowing it.”352 In the result, the Tribunal calls on INAC to “REFORM” its child
welfare program “in order to build a solid foundation for the program to address the real needs of
First Nations children and families living on reserve.”353

2. Tools for dismantling the CSPD

Although specifically about the FNCFS Program, many of the harms identified by the Tribunal
are the same as those affecting all services on reserve identified in Part 2, including inadequate
funding formulas and funding that does not keep pace with inflation, arbitrary decision-making,
346
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confusion/inconsistency around the ‘comparability standard’, and lack of culturally appropriate
services. As well, there were important legal conclusions reached by the Tribunal that can be
harnessed by First Nation to demand change, not only to the FNCFS program, but to bring about
the end of the CSPD on reserve and finally replace it with self-government.
a) Confirms Canada’s Responsibility / Accountability to First Nations

As it does with regard to all services on reserve, Canada argued in Caring Society that its role in
the provision of child welfare services on reserve is strictly limited to funding and being
accountable for the spending of those funds. On this basis, it argued that the Canadian Human
Rights Act did not apply, as “funding” is a not service contemplated under the Act, and, more
broadly, it argued child welfare was under provincial jurisdiction and the federal government
only became involved in child and family services “as a matter of social policy under its
spending power” and not pursuant to any obligations owing under s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867.354

These arguments were soundly rejected by the Tribunal, who, in addition to finding that funding,
in itself can constitute a service under the Act,355 also found that INAC’s role in child welfare
services is key. First, because the manner and extent of INAC’s funding significantly shapes the
child and family services provided.356 Second, beyond funding, INAC provides policy direction
and oversight, as well as negotiates and administers agreements with First Nations and/or
provinces/territories regarding child welfare services.357 The Tribunal found that INAC is “not a
passive player” in its arrangement with First Nations and/or the provinces/territories.358 It found
that, ultimately, it is INAC that has the power to remedy inadequacies with the provision of child
and family services and improve outcomes for children and families residing on reserve. 359
Overall, the Tribunal noted that INAC in fact exercises significant control, discretion and
influence over child welfare services on reserve “through policy and other administrative
354
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directives” and First Nations children and families are a vulnerable category of people vis-à-vis
INAC in this regard.360
Further, the Tribunal thoroughly dismissed INAC’s attempts to minimize its responsibility and
pass it off to the provinces, making a strong statement in this regard:
[83] Instead of legislating in the area of child welfare on First Nations reserves, pursuant to
Parliament’s exclusive legislative authority over “Indians, and lands reserved for Indians”
by virtue of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal government took a
programing and funding approach to the issue. It provided for the application of provincial
child welfare legislation and standards for First Nations on reserves through the enactment
of section 88 of the Indian Act. However, this delegation and programing/funding approach
does not diminish [INAC]’s constitutional responsibilities. …
[84] Similarly, [INAC] should not be allowed to evade its responsibilities to First
Nations children and families residing on reserve by delegating the implementation of
child and family services to FNCFS Agencies or the provinces/territory. [INAC] should
not be allowed to escape the scrutiny of the CHRA because it does not directly deliver
child and family services on reserve.
[85] As explained above, despite not actually delivering the service, [INAC] exerts a
significant amount of influence over the provision of those services. Ultimately, it is
[INAC] that has the power to remedy inadequacies with the provision of child and family
services and improve outcomes for children and families residing on First Nations
reserves and in the Yukon. This is the assistance or benefit [INAC] holds out and intends
to provide to First Nations children and families.
[86] Parliament’s constitutional responsibility towards Aboriginal peoples, in a situation
where a federal department dedicated to Aboriginal affairs oversees a social program and
negotiates and administers agreements for the benefit of First Nations children and
families, reinforces the public relationship between [INAC] and First Nations in the
provision of the FNCFS Program and the related provincial/territorial agreements.361
The Tribunal also found that INAC, within various policy documents, had undertaken to provide
child welfare services in the “best interests of the child” and with the objectives of providing
culturally-appropriate services and promoting the safety and well-being of First Nations
children.362
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These findings are a strong confirmation of Canada/INAC’s responsibility over child welfare
services, and there is no reasonable basis to see why they would not apply with equal force to all
other programs Canada provides on reserve. As noted in Part 2, Canada has long used the fact of
its not having legislated to minimize its responsibility over services on reserve. These findings
by the Tribunal will now prevent Canada and the Department from evading accountability. In
fact, the Tribunal went so far as to use the above findings to suggest that Canada may owe First
Nations specific fiduciary duties in the circumstances.363 First Nations’ vulnerability to the
extensive control and discretion that Canada exercises over the delivery of child welfare services
was a significant factor in the Tribunal’s analysis on fiduciary duty.364 As discussed in Part 2,
there have been several examples of abuse of INAC’s discretion under the current system of
program delivery (CSPD) on reserve in recent times and, the Tribunal has breathed new life into
the fiduciary duty doctrine as mechanism for redress from abuse of INAC’s discretion.
However, the Tribunal also made findings that will permit First Nations to achieve the
elimination of the CSPD, and all the extensive discretion in it, altogether, as I turn to next.

b) Finds systems that perpetuate historic disadvantage endured by Aboriginal
people are discriminatory
The Tribunal’s decision makes it clear that INAC, in providing services on reserve, cannot
perpetuate the historical disadvantage endured by Aboriginal peoples.365 In this regard, the
Tribunal found strong links between the residential school system and the on reserve child
welfare system. The Tribunal observed that when residential schools started to close in the
1960s, the extension of child welfare services on reserves came to be seen as its replacement in
the eyes of government authorities.366

At the time, the assumptions underlying significant

numbers of First Nations children taken into state care via the ‘Sixties Scoop’ were the same
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assumptions underlying the residential school system; namely that First Nations parents were not
capable of properly caring for their children.367

The Tribunal found that the FNCFS program continued to perpetuate the legacy of residential
schools today because Canada’s systemic underfunding of the program creates incentives to
remove children from their homes as a first resort rather than as a last resort.368 The Tribunal
also suggested that the removal of children by child welfare authorities and placement in nonIndigenous homes resembles the residential school system because it also stands to adversely
impact on First Nations’ children ability to learn their languages and culture, which the Tribunal
found are Aboriginal rights that all First Nations children possess.369 Finally, the Tribunal also
suggested that the child welfare system perpetuates the residential school era because First
Nations have little to no control over this system:
Similar to the Residential Schools era, today, the fate and future of many First Nations
children is still being determined by the government, whether it is through the application
of restrictive and inadequate funding formulas or through bilateral agreements with the
provinces.370
The implications of the Tribunal statements and findings here, are extremely significant. The
key message from the Tribunal here is that perpetuating systems that are assimilative—
prohibiting or adversely impacting First Nations ability to exercise their culture and control their
own destinies—are discriminatory.

Without going so far as explicitly saying so, the Tribunal

has suggested a strong connection between First Nations’ equality rights and their right to selfgovernment. This is bolstered by the final significant legal conclusion of the Tribunal in Caring
Society, which I turn to next.
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c) Finds comparability standard discriminatory and equality demands needsbased, culturally appropriate services

While the Tribunal found that the funding of child welfare services was far below and not
comparable to similar services in the provinces and territories, it concluded that equality for First
Nations requires more than just providing the same level of funding. In this regard, the Tribunal
found that INAC’s long-held ‘reasonable comparability’ standard is itself discriminatory.
According to the Tribunal, an approach on reserve that seeks to mirror funding provided by the
provinces and territories is not consistent with substantive equality as it does not consider the
distinct needs and circumstances of First Nation children and families living on reserve,
including their cultural, historical and geographical needs and circumstances.371 In the words of
the Tribunal:
[465] [INAC]’s reasonable comparability standard does not ensure substantive equality
in the provision of child and family services for First Nations people living on reserve. In
this regard, it is worth repeating the Supreme Court’s statement in Withler, at paragraph
59, that “finding a mirror group may be impossible, as the essence of an individual’s or
group’s equality claim may be that, in light of their distinct needs and circumstances, no
one is like them for the purposes of comparison”. This statement fits the context of this
complaint quite appropriately. That is, human rights principles, both domestically and
internationally, require [INAC] to consider the distinct needs and circumstances of First
Nations children and families living on-reserve - including their cultural, historical and
geographical needs and circumstances – in order to ensure equality in the provision of
child and family services to them. A strategy premised on comparable funding levels,
based on the application of standard funding formulas, is not sufficient to ensure
substantive equality in the provision of child and family services to First Nations children
and families living on-reserve.372
According to the Tribunal, in order to meet the governing standard of equality, both funding and
services on reserve must meet the needs of First Nations children and families and be culturally
appropriate. The Tribunal found that INAC’s funding, as it was inadequate, obviously prevented
the services provided by the FNCFS Program from being culturally appropriate: “If funding does
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not correspond to the actual child welfare needs of a specific First Nation community, then how
is it expected to provide services that are culturally appropriate?”373
This finding, like the Tribunal’s suggestion that human rights prohibiting systems which, by
design or by effect, perpetuates First Nation assimilation, bolsters the connection between First
Nations’ equality rights and their right to self-government. The connection is demonstrated in
the following rhetorical question: how can a program meet the needs of the community and be
culturally appropriate if the standards underlying it are not designed and controlled by First
Nations themselves? Or, as stated by a member of the Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council, quoted in
the 1981 Penner Report, “The principle is simple. Only Indian people can design systems for
Indians. Anything other than that is assimilation.”374

To be clear, the Tribunal never goes as far in its reasoning to directly make this connection
between substantive equality and First Nation self-government. But it is a significant implication
of the decision, especially given the Tribunal’s comments that equality prohibits perpetuating of
historic disadvantage like the legacy of residential schools. That being said, there is a tension in
the reasons between this and the continued imposition of provincial child welfare standards on
reserve.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the finding that services on reserve must meet

community needs and circumstances and be culturally appropriate—if it results in the
‘comparability standard’ being found discriminatory—also suggests s 88 of the Indian Act, or,
more generally, the application of provincial child welfare legislation on reserve, is
discriminatory.375 As detailed in Part 1, INAC only adopted the comparability standard after its
attempts to unilaterally delegate services to the provinces through s. 88 largely failed (except
with regard to child welfare). The comparability standard was then adopted in order obtain the
same results that s 88 failed to achieve (imposition of provincial/territorial standards on
reserve—except that Canada paid for the services).

Thus, one would think that if the

comparability standard is discriminatory, so too would be s 88 or the legal doctrine that allows
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provincial child welfare laws to apply on reserve ex proprio vigore.376 For the most part, the
Tribunal remained largely silent on the imposition of provincial child welfare laws on First
Nations via s 88 of the Indian Act or otherwise. The Tribunal’s only comments about s. 88 was
to suggest that it does not “diminish [INAC]’s constitutional responsibilities [to First
Nations].”377 To be fair to the Tribunal, the complainants did not challenge s 88 of the Indian
Act or the imposition of provincial child welfare laws by operation of the doctrine ex proprio
vigore, but only the funding of the FNCFS Program. Thus, the Tribunal was not asked to decide
whether the imposition of provincial child welfare laws on reserve, whether via s 88 or not, was
itself discriminatory and it may not have wanted to have address the issue head-on.378

3. Where to from here?

The Tribunal ordered INAC to cease its discriminatory practices and reform the FNCFS
Program.379

However, the Tribunal declined to give further order on remedy, retaining

jurisdiction and inviting the parties to return and make further submissions, which is now
ongoing.380 It goes without saying that the decision is only binding on INAC with respect to the
FNCFS Program. However, the Tribunal’s finding that the comparability standard is
discriminatory, while not binding on other INAC programs on reserve per se, is nonetheless
persuasive precedent.

Given that the comparability standard and program devolution via

contribution agreement are inextricable linked, and, together are the source of so many harms
adversely impacting First Nations and perpetuating harms of the past (assimilation) and
stereotyping of First Nations (vilification and infantilization), it would seem Canada’s current
system of program delivery on reserve, in total, violates First Nations’ substantive equality
rights.
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While it is true that the decision of an administrative tribunal decision generally carries less
weight as precedent than an appellate or Supreme Court of Canada decision, it bears noting that
recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions reinforce the Tribunal’s finding that, as opposed to
mirroring services, substantive equality requires services that meets the needs and circumstances
of the particular group being services. In 2008, the Court reaffirmed that the governing standard
of equality in Canada is substantive equality and not formal equality381 and using a formal
equality analysis based on mirror comparator groups is detrimental to a proper substantive
equality analysis.382 In addition, in recent cases involving services to be provided to Anglophone
and Francophone communities, the Supreme Court affirmed that substantive equality can mean
distinctive content in the provision of similar services, depending on the nature and purpose of
the services in issue, as well as the characteristics of the population to be served. 383 In another
case, the Supreme Court stated, “The designated beneficiaries of a service’ may and undoubtedly
should affect how those services are delivered.”384

As well, the current running beneath the surface of the Caring Society decision—that, as a
matter of substantive equality, First Nations should exercise control (i.e., self-government) over
programs on reserve—is further supported by the constitutional principle of “subsidiarity”. In
recent years, Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed this principle of federalism, which stands
for the proposition that law-making and its implementation are best achieved at the level of
government that is closest to the citizens affected and thus must be responsive to their needs, to
local distinctiveness, and to population diversity.385 At least one early commentary on the
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Caring Society decision also draws a link between the need for broad reform of programs on
reserve in light of the decision to be consistent with the principle of subsidiary.386

In my view, First Nations self-government over programs and services on reserve, with adequate
funding meeting the needs and circumstances of communities, based in appropriate fiscal
mechanisms that do not impose program standards and monitoring conditions, with a legislative
(or even a constitutional) foundation to clearly define objectives (and prevent future governments
from easily resiling from this course), is the only way forward. As well, as noted earlier, several
scholars have written that implementing self-government this is the only way real improvements
can occur for First Nations. In the words of Shewell and Spagnut:
The solution is a nutshell summary of the 1983 Penner Report. More importantly, it
speaks plainly and simply to the principles of jurisdiction, of self-government for the
future: the right of First Nations to conduct their own affairs in ways appropriate to
themselves and to their own needs and priorities, without fear of external judgement and
with the realization that mistakes will be made but that their resolution will be found
from within.387
Furthermore, for decades, scholars have argued that self-government is an inherent Aboriginal
right, recognized and affirmed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.388 Now the Caring Society
decision also suggests its recognition is a matter of human rights.389

Federal legislation (or provincial legislation in the case of child welfare laws), or worse, federal
policies alone, attempting to accommodate First Nations needs and circumstances through
advisory committees, or the like, will not be sufficient to meet the standard set by Caring Society
case. This would continue to house control with the federal government, as was the case with
the Harper government’s failed attempts to pass the First Nations Control of First Nations
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Education Act.390 As well, these types of ‘advisory’ committees were initially set up under the
1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and were later found to be a failure. In this
regard, an evaluation of the Agreement found, “…the Agreement gave rise to a plethora of
committees and commissions whose powers overlap to such an extent that no one knows exactly
who is responsible for what… The role of native representatives in those bodies is mostly
symbolic and government mostly makes policy decisions without consultation.”391 To repeat the
quote cited in the Penner Report: “Only Indian people can design systems for Indians. Anything
other than that is assimilation.”392

Some have suggested that the ideal process for achieving this outcome is through tripartite
negotiations between the federal government, provinces and territories and First Nations.393
However, I have concerns that such a process may unduly prolong resolution of a problem that
requires immediate attention. Recall that there have been tripartite tables on self-government in
existence since the mid-1970s, which have only resulted in about a dozen concluded agreements
to date. The need for reform is urgent. Further, it is not obvious to me that the participation of
the provinces is necessary. The provinces have eschewed any real role in the delivery of
programs on reserve. The Caring Society decision confirms that services on reserve engage the
federal s 91(24) jurisdiction, suggesting that any role for the province is incidental.

For these

reasons, I believe bilateral discussions, between the federal government and First Nations, would
be the most appropriate.

While there are broader self-government issues that certainly do touch

on the provinces more directly, for example, land and resource issues beyond reserves
boundaries, these can be left for existing tripartite negotiations. As suggested by RCAP, not all
self-government issues need be tackled at once.

As well, the parties should not necessarily need to start from scratch. The Penner Report and the
RCAP Report both contain very detailed and sound recommendations and also recognized that a
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one-sized fits all approach may not necessarily be appropriate or feasible.394

As well, the

Assembly of First Nations, drawing on these reports, has already made sound proposals on how
First Nations’ fiscal relationship with Canada needs to be transformed.395

The current political climate is favourable to these negotiations. As of October 2015, Canada
now has a federal government who campaigned on changing the relationship between First
Nations and Ottawa for the better. Indeed, in the Prime Minister’s mandate letter to the new
Minister of INAC he stated, “No relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the
one with Indigenous Peoples. It is time for a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship with
Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership.”396
Further, very recently, the Minister of Justice (and First Nations lawyer), Jody Wilson-Raybould,
during a special House debate on the suicide crisis in the Attawapiskat First Nation, announced
her government’s commitment to ““complete the unfinished business of Confederation” and
replace the Indian Act with a “reconciliation framework” that would outlast the life of this
administration.”397

Thus, if there was ever a time where sufficient political will could be

garnered to reform the highly problematic system of program delivery on reserve, now is that
time.

However, one also to be realistic and recognize that past attempts to reform this system
(reviewed in Part 1) teach us that the federal government’s efforts to-date have yet to result in
change and, in fact, have resulted in the system becoming more dysfunctional and entrenched.
Since the release of the Caring Society decision, Cindy Blackstock has spoken publicly about her
disappointment with the federal government’s response thus far.398 Also, some members of the
public and media who believe the stereotypes about ‘big pots of money’ and First Nations
leadership corruption and mismanagement will also speak out loudly against reform efforts. As
well, politicians, even well-meaning one, have been susceptible in the past to believing the
394
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stereotype that First Nations just ‘are not yet ready’ for self-government. As well, Department
staff, given their conflict of interest, would likely see such reform as putting their jobs in
jeopardy.

Also, after several years under the Harper government, most staff are likely

conditioned to see their function as monitoring and ensuring ‘compliance’ and to see First
Nations as ‘not ready’ for self-government. For these reasons, INAC staff are unlikely to eagerly
embrace and assist their political masters in undertaking this reform. Thus, even with substantial
political good will, the task will be challenging.

However, now with the Caring Society

decisions, proponents of reform now have additional arguments that, not only is First Nation’s
self-government a matter of respecting inherent s. 35 rights, but a matter of respecting human
rights and, practically, is the only way that will lead to real improvements in the lives of First
Nations people in this county.

While working in partnership with the other levels of government may be the ideal way of
moving forward, First Nations should keep their options open and not rest all their hopes on the
federal government coming through for them. The status quo is unacceptable and it should not
continue any longer. The Caring Society decision tells us it violates substantive equality. Some
have argued that First nations control over programs and services on reserve is already possible
now without the need for further negotiation or legislative recognition by Canada or the
provinces.

RCAP and some scholars have argued that Aboriginal people possess inherent

jurisdiction over core areas including matters vital to the life, welfare, culture and identity of
their peoples and local matters, which can be exercised unilaterally by First Nations without
negotiation with other governments.399 In addition, elsewhere I have argued that the Indian Act
by-law powers, in light of the recent repeal of the Ministerial dissolution power, can now be
harnessed, in tandem with the inherent right, to empower First Nation governments to legislate
over a wide range of local matters affecting their communities.400
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precedent of a First Nations child welfare by-law that, given to the Indian Act paramountcy rules,
supersedes provincial legislation.401

The challenge will be, if First Nations begin to exercise self-government unilaterally, whether
the Department will seek to insist on First Nations following funding agreement program terms
and conditions and view those who do not comply as in default and institute intervention up to or
including third-party management or terminating agreements. Any such response from the
Department would, according to the decision in Caring Society, be discriminatory as preventing
First Nations from obtaining funding in order to provide community-based, culturally
appropriate services, enabling First Nations to seek redress from the Canadian Human Rights
Commission. The decision states that tying funding to providing services that mirror providing
services is discriminatory. Thus, the decision provides significant leverage for First Nations to
now push back on the Department.

CONCLUSION

In this article I have endeavoured to tell the long story and explain the sordid details of how First
Nations have come to be saddled with an extremely dysfunctional and problematic system for
program delivery on reserve, over which they exercise no real control. Various government
administrations, as well as staff of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
have been complicit in the perpetuation of this unacceptable system based on assimilation.

The system is causing numerous serious harms to First Nations peoples, including: (1) it is not
culturally appropriate to the needs and circumstances of First Nations and not improving
conditions on reserve; (2) it excludes First Nations from policy development (i.e., the provinces
don’t generally consult First Nation over essential services since they do not have legislative or
fiscal responsibility for these services); (3) it operates on the basis of standard-form funding
agreements where First Nations are given the choice to ‘take it or leave it’ and most cannot
afford to ‘leave it’; (4) the agreements are conditional upon First Nations adhering to excessive
401
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reporting and disclosure requirements that tie up significant time and resources for First Nations
front-line staff; (5) while Department staff undertake significant monitoring of First Nations,
they do not monitor (and do not report to Parliament) on whether the system is improving
outcomes; (6) the funding agreements are too rigid and not appropriate for a fiscal relationship
between two levels of governments; (7) the system operates with no legislative framework which
gives significant discretion to the Department which can be (and is) subject to abuse of power;
(8) it allows for inconsistent and fluctuating interpretations of program terms such as ‘reasonable
comparability’; (9) it makes it extremely difficult for First Nations to obtain access to redress
where the First Nations have concerns or dispute the Department’s administration of the system;
(10) the system provides little opportunity for Parliament to oversee the Department’s
administration of the system or have regular discussions about the efficacy of the system (except
in times of crises); (11) all programs are knowingly underfunded; (12) funding agreements were
capped from 1996-97 until March 2016 and funding did not keep pace with population growth,
program changes or inflation; (13) the system perpetuates stereotypes that First Nations cannot
competently manage programs either due to corruption and mismanagement or because First
Nations are inept children not capable of handling their own affairs; and (14) Department staff
are in a clear conflict of interest under this system, which causes them to prioritize their
monitoring functions over improving conditions for First Nations.

The recent Caring Society decision is a powerful indictment of this system. First, it finds that
Canada and the Department having knowingly been underfunding services to the most
vulnerable people on reserve, First Nations children. Second, it finds that child welfare services
on reserve has been perpetuating a system reminiscent of the residential schools system because
First Nations children are being separated from their families, language and culture and “the fate
and future of many First Nations children is still being determined by the government.”402 Third
it finds the ‘comparability standard’ to be discriminatory because it insists on mirroring of
provincial standards and funding, instead of promoting programming reflective of First Nations
needs and circumstances. Although only dealing with the Department’s child welfare program,
the decision has broad implications for the delivery of programs on reserve, suggesting the whole
system is inconsistent with the standard of substantive equality. While the decision does not
402
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speak directly about self-government, this would appear to be the inevitable result of a human
rights-compliant approach since the only way for programs to be truly culturally appropriate and
meet community needs and circumstances is for them to be designed and controlled by First
Nations. Anything else perpetuates assimilation.

The Caring Society decision therefore arms First Nations with very powerful arguments to push
for the dismantling of the current dysfunctional, discriminatory and wholly unacceptable system
for program deliver on reserve in favour of self-government.

89

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Statutes
An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act, SC 2008, c. 30
An Act to amend the Indian Act (publication of by-laws) and to provide for its replacement, SC
2014, c 38
Bill C-7, First Nations Governance Act, 2nd sess., 37th Parl., 2002
Canada Assistance Plan, 1966 SC c. 45 [repealed SC 1995, c 17, ss. 31-32]
Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s. 91(24)
Constitution Act, 1982, s 35
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Act, RSC 1985
Family Homes on Reserves and Matrimonial Interests or Rights Act, SC 2013, c 20
Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11
First Nations Financial Transparency Act, SC 2013, c. 7
Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5
Indian Act, SC 1876, c 18
Indian Act, SC 1951, c 29
Mi'kmaq Education Act, SC 1998, c 24
Mi'kmaq Education Act, SNS 1998, c 17
Cases
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40
Alexander v. Maxime (1995), 56 B.C.A.C. 97
Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v. British Columbia (Education), 2015 SCC 21
Attawapiskat First Nation v. Canada, 2012 FC 948
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817
Canada (Attorney General) v. Cold Lake First Nations, 2015 FC 1197
Canada (Attorney General) v. Simon, 2012 FCA 312
Canada (Attorney General) v. Simon, 2015 FCA 18
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 445, aff’d 2013
FCA 75.
Catalyst Paper Corp. v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2
Chief Jesse John Simon, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, 2015 CanLII 67635 (SCC)
Chief Mountain et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al., 2013 CanLII 53406 (SCC)
Day Star First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SKQB 261
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 2 SCR 1010
DesRochers v. Canada (Industry), [2009] 1 SCR 1994
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9
First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada
(for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2015 CHRT 14

90

First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Assembly of First Nations v.
Attorney General of Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development), 2011 CHRT 4
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada
(for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada, 2013
CHRT 16
Grand Chief Stan Louttit et al. v. AGC, 2013 CHRT 27
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism & Culture), 2002 SCC
31
Lac Seul First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development), 2004 FC
1183
Leighton v. British Columbia, [1989] 4 WWR 654
Matson et al. v. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2013 CHRT 13, 2015 FC 398
Micmac First Nation v. Canada (INAC), 2007 FC 1036, aff’d 2009 FCA 377
Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation
and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) et al., 2008 CanLII 18945 (SCC)
Mississaugas of the New Credit First Nation v. Attorney General of Canada, 2013 CHRT 32
Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 527
Montana Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development),
[1989] 1 FC 143 (TD)
Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority, 2010 SCC 14
Mousseau v. Canada (Attorney General) (1993), 126 NSR (2d) 33 (NSCA)
Nacey, Rainville, Dennis v. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014 CHRT
20
NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees'
Union, 2010 SCC 45
Nolan v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 155 DLR (4th) 728
Ochapowace Indian Band No. 71 v. Canada, (1999) 167 Sask. R. 167
Onion Lake Cree Nation v. Canada, FC T-2428-14
Pictou Landing Band Council v. Canada, 2013 FC 342
Pikangikum First Nation v. Canada (INAC), 2002 FCT 1246
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, 2010 SCC 38
R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 SCR 483
R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821
R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451
Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 SCR 721
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61
Renaud, Sutton and Morigeau v. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2013
CHRT 30
Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 387
Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 1117
Thunderchild First Nation v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2015 FC 200
Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 SCR 396

91

Journal Articles & Texts
Alfred, T., “Colonialism and State Dependency”, prepared for the National Aboriginal Health
Organization Project, Communities in Crisis
B.W. Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. v.
Pamajewon” (1997), 42 McGill L.J. 1011
Blackstock, C., “The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal on First Nations Child Welfare: Why if
Canada wins, equality and justice must lose, Children and Youth Services Review (2010),
doi: 10.1016/j.childyouth.2010.09.001
Cassidy, F., “The First Nations Governance Act: A Legacy of Loss” Policy Options – The Public
Forum for the Public Good (online), April 1, 2003
Cornell S., Curtis, C., and Jorgensen, M., “The Concept of Governance and its Implications for
First Nations” in Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2004-02
Culhane Speck, D., “The Indian Health Transfer Policy: A Step in the Right Direction, or
Revenge of the Revenge of the Hidden Agenda?” (1989) 5:1 Native Studies Review 187
Cumming, P.A., and Ginn, D., “First Nation Self-Government in Canada” (1986) Nordic Journal
of International Law 55.1-2 86
Dalton, J.E., “Exceptions, Excuses and Norms: Aboriginal Self-Determination in Canada:
Protections Afforded by the Judiciary and Government” (2006), 21 No. 1 Can. J.L. &
Soc’y 11 at 19-20
Dicey, A.V., An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 6th ed. (1902)
Drummond, D., and Kachuck Rosenbluth, The Debate on First Nations Education Funding:
Mind the Gap (2013), Working Paper 49 (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s
University)
Durst, D., “The Wellness of Aboriginal Children: Seeking Solutions Through Self-Government”
in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada – Current trends and issues, 3rd ed.
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd.: 2008)
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977)
Frideres, “A Critical Analysis of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Self-Government
Model” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada – Current trends and issues, 3rd ed.
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd.: 2008) 123
G.V. Harten, G. Heckman and D.J. Mullen, Administrative Law - Cases, Text, and Materials, 6th
ed. (Edmond Montgomery Publications: 2010), Chapter 1
Gunn, B.L., “Moving Beyond Rhetoric: Working Toward Reconciliation Through SelfDetermination” (2016) 38 Dalhousie L.J. 237
Harris-Short, S., Aboriginal Child Welfare, Self-Government and the Rights of Indigenous
Children – Protection the Vulnerable Under International Law (Ashgate Publishing
Company: Burlington, England, 2012)
Hogg, P. and Turpel, M.E., “Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government: Constitutional and
Jurisdictional Issues” (1995), 74 Can. Bar Rev.187
Hogg, P., Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed.) (loose-leaf), Chap. 6, 28 and 55
Hutchins, P.W., “The Golden Thread of Continuity, the Federalism Principle and Treaty
Federalism – Where’s the Gap?”, March 3, 2009, Paper presented at National Center for
First Nations Governance “Rebuilding our Nations” Conference

92

Hylton, J.H., “The Case for Self-Government : A Social Policy Perspective” in Aboriginal SelfGovernment in Canada – Current Trends and Issues, 2nd ed. (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing Ltd, 1999)
Imai, S., “The Structure of the Indian Act: Accountability in Governance”, Research Report No.
35/2012 for Comparability Research in Law & Political Economy
Jacob, S., and Desautels, G., “Evaluation of Aboriginal Programs: What Place is Given to
Participation and Cultural Sensitivity?”, April 2013, Vol. 4:2, The International
Indigenous Policy Journal, Article 1
Jacobs, L.A., “Mapping the Legal Consciousness of First Nations Voters: Understanding Voting
Rights Mobilization” (2009), prepared for Elections Canada
Johnson, P., Native Children and the Child Welfare System, (Canadian Council on Social
Development in association with James Lorimer & Company: Toronto, 1983) – FN 33
Ladner, K.L. and McCrossan, M., “The Electoral Participation of Aboriginal People,” (2007),
prepared for Working Paper Series on Electoral Participation and Outreach Practices
Lavoie, J., O’Neil, J., Reading, J., Allard, Y., “Community Healing and Aboriginal SelfGovernment” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada – Current trends and issues, 3rd
ed. (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd.: 2008)
Leclair, J., “The Kitkatla Decision: Finding Jurisdictional Room to Justify Provincial Regulation
of Aboriginal Matters” (2003), 21 Sup. Ct. L.R. (2d) 73
Liston, M., “Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State” in
Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed. (Edmond Montgomery Publications, 2013
MacIntosh, C., “Envisioning the Future of Aboriginal Health under the Health Transfer Process”
(2008) Health Law Journal (Special Edition) 67
MacIntosh, C., “Jurisdictional Roulette: Constitutional and Structural Barriers to Aboriginal
Access to Health” in Frontiers of Fairness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005)
McNeil, K. “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments”, Oct. 11, 2007,
Research Paper for the National Center for First Nations Governance
McNeil, K., “Challenging Legislative Infringement of the Inherent Aboriginal Right of SelfGovernment” (2003), 22 Winsor. Y.B. Access to Just. 329
McNeil, K., “Culturally Modified Trees, Indian Reserves and the Crown’s Fiduciary
Obligations” (2003), 12 Sup. Ct. L.R. (2d) 105
McNeil, K., “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments”, supra, at 13-14;
Moodie, D., “Thinking Outside the 20th Century Box: Revisiting Mitchell – Some
Comments on the Politics of Judicial Law-Making in the Context of Aboriginal SelfGovernment since Calder: Search for Doctrinal Coherence” (2003-2004) 35 Ottawa L.R.
1
Mendelson, M., “A Second Look at the First Nations Control of Education Act”, Caledon
Institute of Social Policy, August 2014
Metallic, N., “Indian Act By-Laws: A Viable Means for First Nations to (Re)Assert Control over
Local Matters Now and Not Later”, 2016 UNBLJ (forthcoming)
Metallic, N., “Les droits linguistiques des peoples autochtones” in Les Droits Linguistiques au
Canada,3ième ed., Éditions Yvon Blais, 2013
Papillon, M. “Aboriginal Quality of Life under a Modern Treaty” IRPP Choices, Vol. 14, no. 9,
August 2008, ISSN 0711-0677
Papillon, M., “Canadian Federalism and the Emerging Mosaic of Aboriginal Multilevel
Governance”, Chapter 14 in Bakvis., H. and Skogstad, G. (eds), Canadian federalism:
93

performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2012, p.
284-301
Papillon, M., “Playing Catch-up with Ghosts: Income Assistance for First Nations on Reserve”
in Beland, D., and Daigneault, P.-M., Welfare Reform in Canada: Provincial Social
Assistance in Comparative Perspective, University of Toronto Press, 2014
Papillon, M., « Premières Nations : comment mettre fin au régime de citoyenneté à deux
vitesses? » in Le Forum Au Service du Bien Public, Ferry 11, 2016
Provart, J., “Reforming the Indian Act: First Nations Governance and Aboriginal Policy in
Canada” (2003) 2 Indigenous L.J. 177
Rae, J., “Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone of Quagmire for First Nations?”
(2009) 7 (2) Indigenous LJ 1
Restoule, J.-P., “Aboriginal Education and Self-Government – Accessing Success and
Identifying the Challenges to Restoring Aboriginal Jurisdiction for Education” in in
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada – Current Trends and Issues, 2nd ed. (Saskatoon:
Purich Publishing Ltd, 1999)
Serson, S., “Reconciliation: for First Nations this must include First Fairness” in Aboriginal
Healing Foundation, Response, Responsibility, and Renewal: Canada’s Truth and
Reconciliation Journey, 2009, at 147. ISBN 978-1-897285-72-5
Shewell, H., ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’– Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004)
Shewell, H., and Spagnut, A., “The First Nations of Canada: social welfare and the quest for selfgovernment” in Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples, ed., Dixon, J., and Scheurell,
R.P., London: Routledge, 1995
Sinha, V., Ellenbogen, S. & Trocmé, N., “Substantiating Neglect of First Nations and nonAboriginal Children” (2013) Children & Youth Service Review, 35(12), 2080-2090
Vicaire, P.J., “Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous Rights in a North
American Constitutional Context” (2013), 58 McGill L.J. 607 at 656-657
Wilkins, K., “Still Crazy After All These Years”: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000),
38(2) Alta. L.R. 458
Government Documents
Auditor General of Canada 2014 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chap. 6, First
Nations Policing Program—Public Safety Canada”
Auditor General of Canada, 1994 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons, Vol. 14, Chap. 23, “Indian and Northern Affairs Canada – Social Assistance”
Auditor General of Canada, 2002 December Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 1
– Streamlining First Nations Reporting to Federal Organizations
Auditor General of Canada, 2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons, Chap. 5, “Indian and Northern Affairs Canada – Education Program and PostSecondary Student Report”
Auditor General of Canada, 2006 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 5,
“Management of Programs for First Nations”
Auditor General of Canada, 2008 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons, Chap. 4, “First Nations Child and Family Services Program – Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada”
94

Auditor General of Canada, 2011 Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House
of Commons, Chapter 4, “Programs for First Nations on Reserves”
Auditor General of Canada, 2013 Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chap. 6,
“Emergency Management on Reserves”
Canada, 1995 Federal Policy Guide, “The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation
of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government”
Canada, Address by the Honourable Jane Stewart Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development on the occasion of the unveiling of Gathering Strength — Canada’s
Aboriginal Action Plan, Ottawa, Ontario, Jan. 7, 1998
Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government in
Canada, First Session of the Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83 (“Penner
Report”). Available online: http://caid.ca/PennerRep1983.pdf.
Canada, Library of Parliament Legislative Summaries, “Bill C-7: the First Nations Governance
Act” (Ottawa: 10 October 2002, revised 18 December 2003)
Canada, Mandate Letter to Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Carolyn Bennett, from
Prime Minister Justice Trudeau, November 13, 2015.
Canada, Parliament of Canada, “Aboriginal Roundtable to Kelowna Accord: Aboriginal Policy
Negotiations, 2004-2005”, 4 May 2006, PRB 06-04E
Canada, Political Accord between Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada, represented by
the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet
First Nations Chiefs”, March 27, 1999.
Canadian Human Rights Commission, “A Matter of Rights - Special Report of the Canadian
Human Rights Commission on the Repeal of Section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights
Act” (October 2005)
Citizenship & Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Authority to Introduce Increased Rates of
Assistance to Indians - Details of Request to the Honourable The Treasury Board”,
Ottawa, June 16, 1964.
INAC - Audit and Evaluation Sector, “Special Study: Evolving Funding Arrangements with First
Nations – Final Report”, November 2011, prepared by Donna Cona Inc.
INAC “Devolution” (Draft – 9/8/92) (National Archives).
INAC Directive 205 – Default Prevention and Management (2013)
INAC Presentation, “Oversight of Transfer Payments: AANDC’s Risk-Based Approach – FMI
Workshop Presentation” June 4, 2013
INAC, “A Discussion Paper on Comparability” (2000)
INAC, “Communications Strategy – Task Force on Devolution”, March 16, 1992 (National
Archives) – FN 62
INAC, “Frequently Asked Questions – Funding Approaches.”
INAC, “General Assessments” online: https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1322761862008/1322762014207
INAC, “Indian Band Government Legislation” (1982) (National Archives).
INAC, “Inuit”, online: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014187/1100100014191#sc4
INAC, “Ministerial Transition Book: November 2015”
INAC, “Modernizing Grants and Contributions”, Jan. 11, 2013
INAC, “Multi-Year Funding Agreements – Joint Briefing note for Operations Committee”,
September 10, 1999

95

INAC, “Oversight of Transfer Payments: AANDC’s Risk-Based Approach – FMI Workshop
Presentation”, June 4, 2013
INAC, “Overview – Devolution Task Force” (Draft – 17/3/92) (National Archives) – FN 67
INAC, “Risk Assessment on implementation of revised Income Assistance program manual”,
June 21, 2011
INAC, “Social Program – Design and Control” authored by Gobeil, O., Director of Social
Development Directorate, January 14, 1982 (National Archives).
INAC, “SUFA Accountability Template 2000”
INAC, “The Deputy’s Notes on Devolution: The Next Step,” April 13, 1992 (National
Archives).
INAC, “The Reporting Guide” online: http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1385559716700/1385559777677?utm_source=ReportingGuide&utm_m
edium=url.
INAC, 1991 New Brunswick Social Assistance Manual—First Nations Social Development
Manual.
INAC, AANDC 2013-2014 Performance Report, p. 26 and AANDC 2014-15 Performance
Report
INAC, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “National Social Programs
Manual” (Canada: 2011)
INAC, Aboriginal Recipient Funding Agreement (ARFA), 2012-2012
INAC, Aboriginal Recipient Funding Agreement (ARFA), 2012-2013
INAC, Amending Agreement for Subsequent Years of an ARFA/NARFA for Fiscal Year
2013/2014, Schedule “DIAND-1A” Block Contribution Funding.
INAC, APC Manual Issues, 2011
INAC, Atlantic Regional Office, 1967 Social Welfare Regulation.
INAC, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, “Circular 107 – Application of Provincial
General Welfare Assistance Programs”, Ottawa, July 20, 1974.
INAC, Departmental Audit and Evaluation Branch, “Evaluation of the Alternative Funding
Arrangement (AFA) and Flexible Transfer Payment (FTP) Funding Authorities”,
December 2005
INAC, DIAND/ First Nation Funding Agreement, 2007-2008
INAC, February 20, 2015, Letter to Michipicoten First Nation from INAC Ontario Region,
online: http://www.michipicoten.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AANDC-2014-15Risk-Assessment.pdf
INAC, Financial Statements for the Year Ended March 31, 2015 (Unaudited), available online:
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1445002892771/1445002960229
INAC, First Nation and Tribal Councils National Funding Agreement Model for 2016-2017 –
FN 85
INAC, General Assessment Workbook, online: https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1390855955971/1390855996632
INAC, Implementation Status Update – Report to the Audit and Evaluation Committee”, June
27, 2008
INAC, Income Assistance Program – National Manual, 2005
INAC, March 27, 1992, letter to Letter to I.D. Clark, Secretary of the Treasury Board (National
Archives)
Statistics Canada, Living arrangements of Aboriginal children aged 14 and under, April 13, 2016
96

Treasury Board of Canada, “Population of the Federal Service by Department”, available online
at: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/psm-fpfm/modernizing-modernisation/stats/ssa-pop-eng.asp.
Treasury Board of Canada, From Red Tape to Clear Results – The Report of the Independent
Blue Ribbon Panel on Grant and Contribution Programs, December 2006, ISBN: 978-0662-49799-8
Treasury Board of Canada, Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Indian
and Northern Development and the Treasury Board, August 1990.
Treasury Board of Canada, Treasury Board Minute, T.B. 627879, dated July 23, 1964
Other
Assembly of First Nations, “Fiscal Fairness for First Nations” (2006)
Assembly of First Nations, “Fiscal Fairness for First Nations”, Fact-Sheet, 2006
Assembly of First Nations, Fact Sheet – Quality of Life of First Nations, July 2011
Assembly of First Nations, Transforming the Relationship – Sustainable Fiscal Transfers for
First Nations – A Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance,
Aug. 13, 2010 –
Education Canada Magazine “In Nova Scotia, a Mi’kmaq Model for First Nation Education”
(date unknown)
Institute of Governance, “Special Study on INAC’s Funding Arrangements – Final Report”, 22
December 2008
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (“RCAP Report”), Volume 1, “Looking Forward, Looking Back”
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, Volume 2, “Restructuring the Relationship”
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada – Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the
Future, Introduction
YouTube, “Strombo: Soap Box: Wab Kinew, Jan. 2012
News Articles
September 19, 2012, Globe and Mail, “Yukon first nation worried self-government will collapse
without funding”
2013, Windspeaker, “‘A gun to our heads’ Pressure to sign new funding agreement more
widespread than first thought”, by Ball, D.P. (2013) 13:1
March 15, 2013, Wabanaki Press, “Harper Government Pressures Poorest Community to Sign
Agreement Despite Court Injunction”
March 17, 2013, iPolitics, “Fiscal ‘blackmail’ in Canada’s poorest quarter”
March 19, 2013, CBC News, “Esgenoopetitj First Nation in ‘lose-lose’ over federal funding”
March 25, 2013, CBC News, “Membertou refusing to renew federal funding agreement”
April 1, 2013, Globe and Mail, “Distrust of Harper government grow over First Nation funding
rules”
April 6, 2013, Indian Country, “First Nations Claim Coercion as Harper Makes Aid Contingent
on Legislation Support”
April 8, 2013, NewTalk650, “First Nation rejects federal funding agreement”
97

April 24, 2013, Winnipeg Free Press, “Agreement with feds signed ‘under duress’: First Nation”
May 14, 2013, National Post Commentary by Jesse Kline, “Killing aboriginal with our kindness”
May 29, 2013, Amnesty International Canada, Press Release, “Invasive surveillance of human
rights defender Cindy Blackstock”
November 11, 2013, Law Times article, “Feds pouring big money into aboriginal litigation”
March 21, 2014, CBC News, “First Saskatchewan First Nations reject funding agreements –
Chiefs say new federal rules ask for too much control”
June 16, 2014, CTV News, “Ottawa sued in push for safe drinking water on reserves”
February 20, 2015, Saskatoon Star Phoenix, Editorial, “Fire deaths preventable”, April 2, 2016;
CBC, “Makwa Sahgaiehcan First Nation fire reflects inadequate resources for reserves Fire services underfunded, but regulation of building codes and safety practices also
lacking”
April 8, 2015, APTN, “PM Harper failing to fulfill Mulroney’s Oka promise on modern treaties”
May 20, 2015, 24hrsVancouver entitled, “B.C. First Nations lose social funding”
June 5, 2015, “CBC, “Aboriginal Affairs spending shortfall amounts to $1B, internal document
says - 5-year federal analysis of 'lapsed' spending lists top underspending departments”
July 13, 2015, National Post, “‘Hanging on by a thread’: Fire department of Canada’s most
populated First Nation struggles to stay afloat”
October 6, 2015, NetNewsLedger, “Children are getting sick, our people are struggling –
Neskantaga FN Chief Moonias”
October 13, 2015, PR Newswire Company, “Federal party leaders urged to end drinking water
crisis in First Nation communities once and for all”
October 15, 2015, CBC News, “Bad water: 'Third World' conditions on First Nations in Canada Two-thirds of First Nations have been under at least 1 water advisory between 2004 and
2014”
November 11, 2015, CBC News, “First Nations schools vulnerable to teacher impersonators,
educator says - Officials face challenges in a 'school system that's severely in crisis,' says
Jamie Wilson”
December 1, 2015, KMKNO Press Release, “Document shows that the First Nations’ Social
Case would have had a different outcome”
December 1, 2015, CNW Newswire Company, “Chronic Underfunding of First Nations Police
Forces a Dire Reality: Mashteuiatsh is not an Isolated Case”
December 02, 2015, CBC News, “Mi’kmaq welfare fight with federal government given new
life”
December 8, 2015, Chronicle Herald Op. Ed. by Thompson, R., “N.S. child protection changes
too rushed and overreaching”
December 10, 2015, CBC News, “First Nations welcome lifting of despised 2% funding cap”
December 10, 2015, CBC News, “First Nations welcome lifting of despised 2% funding cap”
December 18, 2015, CBC News, “Carolyn Bennett reinstates funds frozen under First Nations
Financial Transparency Act”
December 21, 2015, Canadian Underwriter, “Nearly half of Canada’s First Nation reserves have
‘little to no’ fire protection: Report”
January 4, 2016, Globe & Mail, “Forcing reports to Ottawa undermines First Nations
accountability”, by Salterio, S. and Evans, R.
January 13, 2016, Timmins Press, “Moose Cree/NAPS aim to stem tide of illegal drugs”

98

January 16, 2016, National Post, Todd MacKay, “All politicians must disclose basic financial
information - including First Nations politicians”
January 25, 2016, CBC News, “La Loche hopes for better future after deadly shootings, struggles
with youth suicides”
January 26, 2016, CBC News, “Canada discriminates against children on reserves, tribunal
rules”
February 22, 2016, CBC News, “Federal government won’t appeal ruling that found it
discriminated against children on reserves”
February 24, 2016, APTN, “33 First Nations declare public health emergency”
March 11, 2016, Winnipeg Free Press, “Support flows to First Nation - Therapists on-site, actor's
help sought in suicide crisis”
March 14, 2016, CBC News, “First Nations students get 30 per cent less funding than other
children, economist says - Don Drummond counters Indigenous Affairs' claim that
funding gap cannot be measured”
March 16, 2016, CBC News, “Cree communities launched and funded own inquiry into 'suicide
pandemic' - Faced with hundreds of suicide attempts, Mushkegowuk Council launched
The Peoples Inquiry”
March 16, 2016, National Post, Lois Frank, Harley Frank and Todd MacKay, “First Nations
leaders benefit from transparency”
March 18, 2016, National Post, “Anger, confusion as Manitoba RCMP charge 15-year-old boy
with murder of 11-year-old Teresa Robinson”
March 22, 2016, APTN News, “Budget 2016: Trudeau Liberals blow 2 per cent cap with
‘unprecedented’ $8.4 billion investment”.
March 22, 2016, APTN News, “Budget 2016: Trudeau Liberals blow 2 per cent cap with
‘unprecedented’ $8.4 billion investment”
March 24, 2016, Regina Leader-Post, “Peepeekisis Cree Nation members gather on highway to
protest federal funding agreement”
March 27, 2016, Toronto Star, “Cindy Blackstock, since mom to 163,000 kids”
March 27, 2016, APTN, “Federal Liberal budget failed First Nation children, families:
Blackstock”
March 29, 2016, The Canadian Press, “Medical crisis ongoing for Ontario reserves”
April 1, 2016, CBC News, “Obedjiwan dismantles police service, SQ takes over”
April 7, 2016, Bains, R., “Ottawa Should Grant Property Rights on First Nations Reserves”
April 11, 2016, CTV News, 'A national tragedy': AFN demands action, funding for
Attawapiskat”
April 13, 2016, CBC News, “Attawapiskat suicide crisis: MPs hold emergency debate over
suicide attempts”
April 13, 2016, APTN News, “During suicide debate Justice Minister says it’s time for First
Nations to shed Indian Act ‘shackles’”

99

100

